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I OBJECT: THE RLUIPA AS A MODEL FOR PROTECTING 
THE CONSCIENCE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS TO 
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS† 
ABSTRACT 
In most states, the battle over same-sex marriage has become a showdown 
with either gay rights activists or religious conservatives prevailing.  Each side 
is fearful of losing ground to the other.  Many scholars have noted the threats 
to religious liberty that arise upon the recognition of same-sex marriage, but 
few have given significant attention to how religious liberty might be protected 
without abolishing the rights of same-sex couples.  This Comment focuses on 
one manifestation of the conflict between same-sex rights and religious liberty: 
the conflict that arises when individuals and organizations are compelled by 
their religious beliefs to violate state civil rights statutes protecting same-sex 
couples.  Such violations expose them to civil liability for acting in accordance 
with their religious beliefs. 
This Comment examines the shortcomings of the United States Supreme 
Court’s current free exercise jurisprudence as well as current broad-based 
statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in protecting 
religious objectors in the context of same-sex rights.  It then proposes a 
number of possible ways to protect religious objectors, concluding that while 
state statute-specific exemptions would be a more direct, and perhaps 
preferred, method of protecting religious objectors, the absence of state 
solutions and the need to implement a uniform approach to rights of 
conscience suggest a federal approach.  A statute modeled on the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, (RLUIPA) would provide a more 
comprehensive and balanced approach than the funding legislation that has 
typically been used by Congress to protect other types of conscience rights.  By 
providing some protection for religious individuals, such a federal conscience 
statute could lessen the tension between advocates for gay rights and 
advocates for religious liberty.  While this Comment focuses explicitly on 
certain classes of religious objectors in the context of same-sex rights, the 
 
 † This Comment received the 2008 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and 
Writing. 
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proposed solution could include provisions covering any class of religious 
objectors. 
INTRODUCTION 
But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.  
That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of its substance is 
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing 
order. 
—Justice Robert Jackson1 
Guadalupe Benitez is a lesbian woman who decided with her partner 
Joanne to have a child.2  After several unsuccessful attempts to become 
pregnant, Benitez was diagnosed in 1999 with polycystic ovarian syndrome, a 
condition that is characterized by irregular ovulation.3  As a result, Benitez was 
referred to the North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. (North Coast), 
where she met with Dr. Christine Brody, an obstetrician–gynecologist.4  Dr. 
Brody informed Benitez of the possibility of using a procedure called 
intrauterine insemination (IUI) to get pregnant.5  Unlike the more common 
practice of self-insemination that Benitez had been using, during IUI a doctor 
inserts semen directly into the patient’s uterus through a catheter.6  In 
explaining this procedure, however, Dr. Brody told Benitez up front that if IUI 
became necessary, she would not be able to perform the procedure for Benitez 
because of her religious beliefs.7 
Following their initial conversation, Dr. Brody continued to treat Benitez 
for infertility, performing diagnostic surgery and prescribing ovulation-
inducing medication to be used in conjunction with self-insemination.8  At 
some point in 2000, based in part on Dr. Brody’s advice, Benitez decided to try 
IUI.9  Dr. Douglas Fenton, another physician at North Coast, was asked to 
 
 1 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 2 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal. 
2008). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Dr. Brody asserts that her religious beliefs precluded her from performing IUI, or any other medical 
procedure that facilitates pregnancy, for any unmarried woman, but Benitez suspects that Dr. Brody’s refusal 
was based on her sexual orientation.  Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 964. 
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perform the procedure, but he also refused because of his religious beliefs.10  
Dr. Fenton referred Benitez to a physician outside the North Coast practice 
who performed the IUI.11  Benitez did not become pregnant as a result of the 
procedure but eventually resorted to in vitro fertilization, which enabled her to 
conceive in 2001.12  Shortly thereafter, Benitez filed suit against North Coast, 
Brody and Fenton, alleging violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.13  Among 
other defenses, Brody and Fenton asserted that their refusal to perform IUI for 
Benitez was protected under the free exercise clauses of the U.S. and 
California constitutions.14 
In August 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled on the doctors’ 
defenses, holding that, to the extent their refusal to perform the procedure was 
based on Benitez’s sexual orientation, the act of refusal was not protected 
under either the federal or state constitutions.15  Advocates for same-sex rights 
celebrated the decision as a victory over “fundamentalist Christian doctors.”16  
Benitez spoke out saying, “it’s a win for everyone, because anyone could be 
the next target if doctors are allowed to pick and choose their patients based on 
religious views about other groups of people.”17  Not everyone shared this 
enthusiasm, however.  Americans United for Life, an anti-abortion advocacy 
group, issued a news release entitled “California Supreme Court Ruling 
Threatens Medical Care and Religious Freedom.”18  The group argued that the 
decision will only worsen the shortage of healthcare workers and that, 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id.  At the time, Dr. Fenton believed that Benitez would be using fresh sperm in the procedure, and 
since he was the only doctor at North Coast who was licensed to prepare fresh sperm, Dr. Fenton referred 
Benitez to Dr. Michael Kettle, a physician outside the North Coast practice.  Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 967; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007). 
 14 N. Coast, 189 P.3d at 967. 
 15 Id. at 968–69.  Although the doctors claim that their decision was based on the plaintiff’s marital status 
rather than her sexual orientation, and therefore they did not violate the state civil rights statute, regardless of 
the doctors’ intentions in this particular case, North Coast illustrates of the type of conflict that may arise 
between the rights of a lesbian patient and the religious conscience of a doctor whose religious beliefs prohibit 
him or her from performing IUI for that patient. 
 16 Press Release, Lambda Legal, California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Lambda Legal Lesbian 
Client Denied Infertility Treatment by Christian Fundamentalist Doctors (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www. 
lambdalegal.org/news/pr/california-supreme-court-benitez-decision.html. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Press Release, Matthew Eppinette, Americans United for Life, California Supreme Court Ruling 
Threatens Medical Care and Religious Freedom (Aug. 18, 2008), http://blog.aul.org/2008/08/18/california-
supreme-court-ruling-threatens-medical-care-and-religious-freedom/. 
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ultimately, forcing healthcare workers to perform procedures that violate their 
conscience will not benefit patients.19 
The dispute in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group Inc. v. San 
Diego County Superior Court is just one example of the sort of conflict that 
can arise between the statutory right of a same sex couple to be free from 
discrimination and the right to religious freedom of a private party who refuses 
to perform procedures that violate their conscience.  In recent years, similar 
conflicts have arisen between individuals seeking to effect their rights to 
reproductive health services, including abortion, and health care providers 
who, for example, refuse to perform abortions or dispense oral contraception.20  
This Comment specifically addresses conflicts that, as in North Coast, arise 
between the rights of same-sex couples and the religious liberty of those who 
object to performing certain services for same-sex couples.  Part I of this 
Comment discusses the current landscape of rights afforded to same-sex 
couples under state and federal law and provides examples of specific conflicts 
that could arise.21  This Part suggests that in determining the proper scope of 
any religious exemptions, potential conflicts should be evaluated based on 
several factors, including the availability of alternative service providers and 
how directly the views of the individual or organization refusing to provide 
services conflict with the requirements of the law protecting same-sex couples.  
Part II presents both policy-based arguments and historical precedents for 
providing exemptions for certain categories of religious objectors whose duties 
conflict with same-sex rights.22  This discussion demonstrates that far from 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77 (Douglas 
Laycock, et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter EMERGING CONFLICTS] (describing various state and federal responses 
to protect doctors and pharmacists who refuse to perform abortions or issue contraceptives). 
 21 This Comment takes no position on the appropriateness of laws either prohibiting or enabling same-
sex marriage.  Further, although this Comment suggests certain limited religious exemptions from laws 
protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it in no way seeks to encourage such 
discrimination or to legitimize bigotry toward same-sex couples. 
 22 This Comment touches on some of the history and policy reasons for protecting religious objectors, but 
for a more comprehensive treatment of this issue, see J. Brady Brammer, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights 
Movement: Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 995 (2006) (arguing that suppression of 
religious speech in opposition to the gay rights movement would erode fundamental conscience rights 
important to both gay rights and religious activists); Alvin C. Lin, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws 
and the Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO. L.J. 
719 (2001) (arguing for the general applicability test for religious freedom claims to avoid creating exemptions 
from antidiscrimination statutes); Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the 
Eroding Moral Market-Place, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 85–86 (2006) (arguing for a marketplace 
approach to protecting the right of conscience for pharmacists). 
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being a radical solution, religious exemptions are grounded in the American 
historical tradition. 
Part III discusses the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s current free 
exercise jurisprudence, demonstrating that the U.S. Constitution, as currently 
interpreted by the Court, provides little functional protection for religious 
objectors in the context of same-sex rights.  Part III also examines free exercise 
protections under state constitutions and concludes that, while state 
constitutions may offer more protection for religious objectors than the U.S. 
Constitution, the end result is often the same.  Part IV analyzes the 
effectiveness of a variety of statutes that have been used to expand the free 
exercise of religion, including statute-specific exemptions as well as statutes 
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which raise the level of 
scrutiny for certain free exercise claims.  Part IV concludes that these statutes 
do not adequately protect religious objectors23 in the context of same-sex 
marriage. 
Given the diversity of state statutes and constitutional provisions protecting 
free exercise and the weak interpretations by courts of these provisions, Part V 
argues that a federal statute that provides religious exemptions is the best way 
to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights of same-sex couples and 
the religious liberty of religious objectors.  Specifically, a federal statute 
modeled on RLUIPA, which effectively requires the application of strict 
scrutiny to free exercise claims against states involving prisoners and land use, 
would provide a balanced, uniform approach to protecting the rights of 
religious objectors in all states without nullifying the rights of same-sex 
couples. 
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAME-SEX RIGHTS AND RELIGION 
Over the past few decades, much controversy has ensued over the issue of 
same-sex relationships.24  Scholars have debated from religious, social, and 
economic perspectives the pros and cons of allowing same-sex marriage, civil 
 
 23 Throughout this Comment, this phrase will be used to refer to any individual whose religious beliefs 
cause him or her to refuse to perform a legally recognized obligation. 
 24 Kari Huus, Battle Joined over Same-Sex Marriage: Regional Cases Foreshadow Fight over U.S. 
Constitution, MSNBC, Feb. 27, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4304099/. 
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unions, and other legal relationships.25 Legislatures have responded to these 
debates in a variety of ways.  Section A provides an overview of the current 
state of the law regarding the rights of same-sex couples.  Section B examines 
the scope of the conflicts that arise between one party’s civil rights to engage 
in same-sex relationships26 and another party’s rights to religious freedom, 
arguing that the more direct the religious objector’s role in establishing 
marriage or family, the greater the need for religious exemptions from laws 
that establish the rights of same-sex couples. 
A. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under Current Law 
The country is currently divided over the issue of same-sex relationships.27  
The rights afforded same-sex couples by the federal government are slim, 
mirroring the rights of same-sex couples in the majority of states.28  States 
have responded to the issue of same-sex marriage in a variety of ways.  Some 
have extended a variety of rights to same-sex couples, including civil rights, 
civil unions, and same-sex marriage.  Some have explicitly foreclosed the right 
to same-sex marriage while still providing civil rights or civil unions.29  An 
overview of these state responses is necessary to understand the scope of the 
conflict between the right to same-sex marriage and religious liberty, the 
present patchwork of same-sex rights implicated in this conflict, and the 
continuing reluctance by many states and the federal government to recognize 
same-sex rights. 
 
 25 See, e.g., Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Economics Defense of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 115 (2001) (presenting an economic rationale for recognizing 
same-sex marriage); Erwin Chemerinsky, Same Sex Marriage: An Essential Step Towards Equality, 34 SW. U. 
L. REV. 579, 580 (2005) (“[A]t the very least, civil union has to be regarded as a basic civil right.”); George W. 
Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 593–644 (1999) (defending the rationales 
for traditional, heterosexual marriage and arguing against recognition of same-sex marriage); Paul Royal, The 
Right to Say “I Do”: The Legality of Same-Sex Marriage, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 245, 246 (1996) 
(“[S]tates should allow gay marriages not only because the present marriage statutes are unconstitutional, but 
also because no valid policy supports the ban.”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a 
Man and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 1365 (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage has detrimental 
effects on society). 
 26 Throughout this article, the phrase “rights of same-sex couples” will be used to denote the right to 
same-sex marriage as well as the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 27 See Andrea Stone, Battle over Gay Marriage Renewed on California Ballot, USA TODAY, June 12, 
2008, at 2A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-06-11-Gaymarriage_N.htm (describing 
the renewed struggle over same-sex marriage in various states). 
 28 See Breslau, infra note 40. 
 29 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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1. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under Federal Law 
Although two of the Court’s decisions have expanded the rights of same-
sex couples,30 neither the Court nor Congress has recognized a right to same-
sex marriage or imposed a broad prohibition against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.  The Court recognized a right to privacy for same-
sex couples in Lawrence v. Texas, where it struck down a Texas law that 
prohibited certain homosexual conduct.31  The Court based its decision on the 
due process liberty interests of the defendants, who were charged under the 
Texas criminal statute at issue.32 
Prior to Lawrence, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited any action by the state 
or by local governments to grant “special rights” or protections to 
homosexuals.33  The Court found that the Colorado provision violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it had no rational basis.34  While Lawrence 
and Romer indicate that the Court might be willing to recognize constitutional 
rights for same-sex couples at some point in the future, the Court has not gone 
so far as to recognize a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Due 
Process or Equal Protection Clauses, or designate sexual orientation as a 
suspect classification justifying strict scrutiny.35 
Currently, federal legislation offers even less protection for same-sex 
couples than the Court’s jurisprudence.  Discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is not covered by federal civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.36  Furthermore, the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) rejects the notion of same-sex marriage by specifically defining 
marriage—for federal purposes—as a union between a man and a woman.37  
 
 30 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 31 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 32 Id. at 562–63. 
 33 Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
 34 See id. at 635 (“We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or 
discrete objective.”). 
 35 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 787 (3d. ed. 2006). 
 36 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e(15) (2006). 
 37 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  Although President Obama pledged to seek a repeal of DOMA law during his 
2008 presidential campaign, the law’s future remains uncertain.  In the early days of his administration,  the 
President has avoided taking a strong stance on gay rights.  See Brian Montopoli, Obama Faces Gay Groups’ 
Growing Anger, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/06/15/poliitcs/politicalhotsheet/entry 
5090503.shtml (discussing the Obama Administration’s DOJ brief in support of DOMA and the resulting 
frustration of gay rights advocates). 
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The Executive Branch has offered some limited protection to same-sex couples 
through executive orders that institute an internal policy banning 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation.38  Although 
Congress and the President implemented a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in 
1993, governing men and women serving in the military, the policy has 
curtailed, not expanded, homosexual rights.39 
2. Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under State Law 
States have responded to the debate over same-sex marriage in a variety of 
ways.  The majority have passed laws that, like the federal DOMA, define 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman.40  Unlike the federal 
DOMA, however, at least thirty states have adopted these provisions as state 
constitutional amendments,41 making the state definitions more difficult to 
change than the federal definition.  Six states currently allow same-sex 
marriage.42  The high courts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa have 
recognized the right to same-sex marriage under their respective state 
constitutions..43  Statutes providing for same-sex marriage have been passed in 
Maine,44 New Hampshire,45 and Vermont.46 
 
 38 See U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Addressing Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Federal Civilian 
Employment: A Guide to Employee’s Rights, http://www.opm.gov/er/address2/Guide01.asp (last visited July 
14, 2009) (referring to Executive Order 13087, which “prohibits discrimination based upon sexual orientation 
within Executive Branch civilian employment”). 
 39 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).  While this policy was initially introduced by President Clinton to give more 
rights to homosexuals than the previous policy of a complete ban on homosexuals in the military, the statute 
passed by Congress maintained the ban on homosexuals in the military where there are findings of regular 
homosexual conduct or where the individual openly acknowledges his or her sexual orientation.  The policy 
has been heavily criticized over the past fifteen years.  See Mark Thompson, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Turns 15, 
TIME, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1707545,00.html (discussing the history 
behind the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and describing aspirations of Democrats to eliminate it). 
 40 See Karen Breslau, After the Vows: What’s Next in the Fight over Same-Sex Marriage, NEWSWEEK, 
June 17, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/141935 (noting that as of June 2008, forty-four states had passed 
prohibitions against same-sex marriage).  For example, the Georgia Constitution provides that the “state shall 
recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman.  Marriages between persons of the same sex are 
prohibited in this state.”  GA. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 41 E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.  For a complete list of states with current 
amendments, see DOMA Watch, Marriage Amendment Summary, http://www.domawatch.org/amendments/ 
amendmentsummary.html (last visited July 14, 2009). 
 42 The California Supreme Court also recognized a state constitutional right to marriage in In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008), but the court’s decision was subsequently overridden by the passage of 
Proposition 8 in November 2008, an amendment to the California Constitution defining marriage as “between 
a man and a woman.”  Jessica Garrison, et al., ELECTION 2008: GAY MARRIAGE; Nation Watches as State 
Weighs Ban; Prop. 8 Battle Drew Money and Attention from Across the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1. 
 43 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that a denial of marriage 
rights to same-sex couples violates equal protection rights of Connecticut citizens); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. 
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Some states also grant rights to same-sex couples through laws permitting 
civil unions or statutes that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
However, even some states that have defined marriage as a heterosexual 
monogamous union have passed laws permitting civil unions for same-sex 
couples and banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.47  A handful of 
states provide rights to same-sex couples through civil union or domestic 
partnership statutes.48  At least twenty states and the District of Columbia 
currently prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
employment, and some of these states prohibit discrimination in housing or 
places of public accommodation as well.49  Even some states that have defined 
marriage as a heterosexual monogamous union provide for civil unions for 
same-sex couples and prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.50  
Though same-sex couples currently enjoy some rights in less than half of the 
states, conflicts between same-sex rights and religious liberty have already 
begun to surface. 
 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violates 
equal protection rights of Massachusetts citizens); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (striking 
down an Iowa statute that defined marriage as between a man and a woman as a violation of the equal 
protection rights of Iowa citizens). 
 44 An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. 
82 (West) (providing for same-sex marriage in Maine). 
 45 2009- 59 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (providing for same-sex marriage in 
New Hampshire). 
 46 An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, 2009-3 Vt. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. 5 (LexisNexis) (providing for same-sex marriage in Vermont effective Sept. 1, 2009). 
 47 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5 (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 51 (West 2007) (protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.04.010 (2009) (defining marriage as between a male and a female); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010–
26.60.901 (2009) (establishing domestic partnerships for same-sex couples). 
 48 Through civil union or domestic partnership statutes, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Washington, and the District of Columbia ensure that same-sex couples are granted at least some of the same 
rights or benefits as heterosexual married couples.  See Christine Nelson, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Mar. 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/civilunions_domesticpartnership_statutes.htm (describing the 
rights given to same-sex couples in each of these states). 
 49 See NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., http://www. 
thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_7_08.pdf (last visited July 14, 2009) 
(showing a map of states that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity). 
 50 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5 (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 51 (West 2007) (protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.04.010 (2009) (defining marriage as between a male and a female); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010–
26.60.901 (2009) (establishing domestic partnerships for same-sex couples). 
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B. Conflicts Between Same-Sex Rights and Religious Liberty 
Following Massachusetts’s recognition of same-sex marriage in 2003,51 
scholars began to examine the conflicts between the rights of same-sex couples 
and the religious freedom of individuals and organizations opposed to same-
sex marriage based on religious reasons.52  Within this broad range of conflicts 
lies the subset of conflicts at issue here: the civil liability of private individuals 
and organizations that refuse to perform services for same-sex couples. 
This section will examine two subcategories of conflicts involving same-
sex rights and religious objectors: “first order conflicts” and “second order 
conflicts.”  These categories were first defined in an essay by Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, who has authored several works on the conflicts arising between 
same-sex marriage and religious liberty.  Wilson refers to “first order 
conflicts” as those related to the solemnization of marriage itself.53  These 
conflicts arise between the same-sex couple and the state or church 
representatives responsible for licensing or performing the marriage 
ceremony.54  “Second order conflicts” are those involving the same-sex couple 
and private individuals or organizations who are not acting on behalf of the 
state.55  This category of second order conflicts includes a wide spectrum of 
conflicts, but this section suggests that not all of these conflicts should give 
rise to a religious exemption.  Instead, it will provide examples of conflicts that 
should warrant an exemption and those that should not, and will suggest 
several factors for distinguishing between them. 
1. Examples of First Order Conflicts 
To date, no U.S. court has dealt with the issue of whether ministers and 
public officials are required to solemnize same-sex marriages against their 
religious beliefs.56  The dearth of case law in this area could be due to the fact 
that same-sex couples prefer to find officials who support same-sex marriage 
 
 51 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 52 See, e.g., Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007) (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage could create civil 
liability for religious institutions and individuals who are opposed to it and could prevent religious institutions 
from accessing government benefits); Marc. D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in EMERGING 
CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 1, 1 (discussing how conflicts between same-sex marriage and religious liberty 
might impact free speech, civil liability, and possible ineligibility for public funding). 
 53 Wilson, supra note 20, at 97. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. at 95 (referring to potential court reactions to this conflict in hypothetical terms). 
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to perform their ceremonies.  However, first order conflicts still might arise in 
the future.  The lack of case law also is likely due in part to the small number 
of states that recognize same-sex marriage.57  While the second order conflicts 
described below tend to arise out of the more common civil rights statutes 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,58 first order 
conflicts will only arise in states that recognize a right to same-sex marriage.59  
Currently, this right is recognized in only six states, and the rights in four of 
these states were recognized in 2009.60  Further, the three states that recognize 
same-sex marriage by statute, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont, provide 
that members of the clergy are not required to perform same-sex marriages.61 
Some scholars argue that there is no case law on first order conflicts 
because potential claimants recognize that, even in states that do not formally 
exempt clergy from performing same-sex marriage ceremonies, courts are 
generally not allowed to involve themselves in the internal affairs of a religious 
body.62  While it would be surprising, and perhaps constitutionally suspect 
under the Establishment Clause, for courts to examine the reasons given by a 
member of the clergy for refusing to perform a marriage ceremony, given 
current court doctrines such as the ministerial exception and the avoidance of 
excessive entanglement, one cannot say for certain how a court would rule on 
 
 57 See supra Part I.A.2 (listing the states that recognize same-sex marriage). 
 58 NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 49. 
 59 The conflict in states providing for civil unions exists when a government official refuses to participate 
in the formation of a civil union.  E.g., Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 430 (Vt. 2001) (affirming the dismissal 
of claims brought by town clerks who asserted “that their obligation under the civil union law to either issue a 
civil union license or to appoint an assistant to do so” violated their free exercise rights under the Vermont 
Constitution).  While this conflict deserves attention, it is less controversial than the conflict involving same-
sex marriage where ministers and religious institutions are affected. 
 60 See supra notes 43–46. 
 61 2009-59 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 4 (LexisNexis); An Act to End Discrimination in Civil 
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. 82 (West); An Act to Protect Religious 
Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, 2009-3 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 9 (LexisNexis).  New 
Hampshire passed a separate religious freedom statute relating to marriage, which provides that a religious 
organization: 
shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to the solemnization of marriage, the 
celebration of marriage, or the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, programs, 
courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals, and such solemnization, 
celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs and faith. 
2009 61 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 2 (LexisNexis).  Though courts have not yet interpreted the 
statute, the terms “promotion of marriage” and “celebration of marriage” could have far-reaching effects. 
 62 Wilson, supra note 20, at 97. 
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this issue.63  It is also possible that, since members of the clergy are licensed to 
solemnize marriages on behalf of the state, state legislatures could require 
them to perform same-sex marriages in order to keep their licenses.64  Thus, 
while protections for clergy who refuse to perform same-sex marriages should 
be obsolete, this is not a foregone conclusion.  The exemptions proposed in this 
Comment would ensure that clergy have the right to refuse to perform same-
sex marriage ceremonies despite any contrary state law or court ruling that 
might otherwise arise.65 
In those jurisdictions that recognize a right to same-sex marriage, both in 
the United States and abroad, there have already been some signs of the 
potential for first order conflicts.  Following the Goodridge decision, which 
recognized a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, 
twelve justices of the peace in Massachusetts resigned from their positions to 
avoid solemnizing same-sex marriages.66  Other countries have dealt with the 
potential for first order conflicts up front to avoid dealing with them in 
practice.  Canada has attempted to resolve any such conflicts before they arise 
by enacting a religious exemption for members of the clergy who object to 
same-sex marriage, and the European Union has issued an advisory opinion 
recommending exemptions for clergy opposed to same-sex marriage where 
possible.67  These examples show that the United States need not wait until 
conflicts arise to adopt a solution. 
2. Examples of Second Order Conflicts 
Second order conflicts are those that involve a conflict between the rights 
of two private parties, where one party is asked to recognize the rights of the 
 
 63 It is conceivable that courts might choose to allow clergy and religious groups autonomy for decisions 
on who to marry generally but with an exception stating that refusal cannot be based on the couples’ sexual 
orientation. 
 64 This would be similar to the current situation for pharmacists in states that have passed “duty to fill” 
laws requiring pharmacists to issue prescriptions for contraceptive pills despite religious objections.  For an 
examination of these laws, see Erica L. Norey, Note, Duty to Fill? Threats to Pharmacists’ Professional and 
Business Discretion, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 95 (2007). 
 65 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 102 (predicting that litigation will arise over the duties of individuals and 
organizations to support same-sex couples and arguing that “[s]tates can deflect this litigation, as they have 
with abortion and other deeply divisive questions in healthcare, by deciding now whether issues of conscience 
matter”). 
 66 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at 
A16. 
 67 E.U. Network of Indep. Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4-2005: The Right to 
Conscientious Objection and the Conclusions by EU Member States of Concordats with the Holy See (Dec. 14, 
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2005_4_en.pdf. 
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other party in a way that would violate the first party’s religious beliefs.  
Subsection a describes two examples of second order conflicts that are directly 
related to marriage and family: fertility treatment and adoption.  Subsection b 
provides other examples of second order conflicts that are more loosely 
connected to marriage and the family and offers several factors for determining 
whether a second order conflict should give rise to a religious exemption. 
a. Conflicts Directly Related to the Family 
Two recent California lawsuits provide examples of second order conflicts 
that can arise between same-sex rights and religious conscience rights in the 
contexts of medical treatment and adoption.  First, second order conflicts are 
likely to arise in the area of healthcare and fertility services.  Although the 
physicians in North Coast maintained that their refusal to facilitate Benitez’s 
pregnancy through IUI was based on the fact that she was unmarried, the 
California Supreme Court held that if the doctors’ decision was based on 
Benitz’s sexual orientation their action violated California law.68  The case 
thus illustrates the potential tension between the rights of same-sex couples and 
the religious liberty of healthcare workers whose job it is to facilitate 
pregnancies. 
The second context in which second order conflicts are likely to arise is in 
the area of adoption.  In Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, same-sex partners 
filed suit against the owners of Adoption.com, which offers a service that 
allows prospective adoptive parents to post a profile online that can be viewed 
by women who plan to give their children up for adoption.69  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants’ rejection of their application to post a profile on 
the website based on the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation constituted a violation of 
California’s civil rights statute.70  The parties ultimately settled the dispute 
before trial,71 but the Butler case is not the only example of the tension 
between the rights of same-sex couples and the mission of certain adoption 
organizations.  Perhaps the most noted example of this conflict came in 2006, 
when Catholic Charities stopped placing children for adoption in 
Massachusetts after the state refused to grant the organization an exemption 
 
 68 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal. 
2008). 
 69 Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 475, 476 (2008). 
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from state law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.72  This not only shows the potential for conflict between the 
religious beliefs motivating certain adoption agencies and state laws protecting 
same-sex couples but also demonstrates the potential negative consequences of 
failing to provide an exemption for certain adoption agencies.  Rather than 
serve same-sex couples, Catholic Charities chose to stop providing services in 
Massachusetts altogether.73 
b. Distinguishing Among Second Order Conflicts 
In her statements to the press,74 Benitez, the plaintiff in North Coast, 
recognized the importance of limiting religious exemptions or 
accommodations in the interest of protecting same-sex couples.  The California 
decision thus demonstrates that without limiting accommodations for religious 
objectors, laws like the California civil rights statute at issue in North Coast 
will become a mere policy view of the state, offering no real protection.  The 
rights of same-sex couples must be considered in crafting religious 
exemptions, and the exemptions must be applied in a way that protects 
religious objectors without encouraging mere prejudice against same-sex 
couples.  This Comment suggests using the directness of participation required 
by the religious objector as a way to measure the severity of the burden on the 
religious objector and limit the scope of religious exemptions.  For example, 
the doctors in North Coast did not refuse to treat Benitez altogether; their 
religious objection applied only to IUI because IUI would have directly 
facilitated the pregnancy.75  Thus, the doctors’ objections were based not 
merely on their patient’s sexual orientation but also on the direct link between 
their own actions and the establishment of a family for Benitez. 
In determining whether a particular conflict rises to a level that calls for a 
religious exemption, the following factors should be considered: the nature of 
the activity that the religious objector seeks an exemption from; the centrality 
of the activity and/or the objection to the objector’s religious views; and the 
availability of alternative service providers.  Thus, if the objection is based on 
 
 72 Id. at 479–80. 
 73 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 102 (noting that by not providing an exemption for Catholic Charities, 
Massachusetts “prodded Catholic Charities to cease providing adoption services altogether, forcing other 
agencies to absorb the placement of those children and likely lengthening the placement process”). 
 74 See supra text accompanying notes 16 & 17. 
 75 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal. 
2008). 
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religious views of same-sex relationships, the more directly the objector 
participates in establishing or promoting this relationship, the more central the 
objection will be to his or her religious beliefs.76  For example, activities like 
performing a marriage ceremony or providing IUI are directly related to the 
establishment of the family, or a same-sex relationship, but activities like 
treating a cold or serving dinner to a same-sex couple in a public restaurant are 
not.77  The connection between the latter hypothetical activities of the objector 
and the existence of the same-sex relationship is attenuated at best. 
The difficulty, of course, is that second order conflicts range across a rather 
broad spectrum, with many activities falling into gray areas.  For instance, 
should exemptions apply to a restaurant owner who refuses to host the 
wedding ceremony or reception of a same-sex couple?78  Similarly, should an 
exemption be provided for a doctor who goes one step further than Dr. Brody 
and refuses to prescribe fertility medications to a lesbian patient?  Part of the 
analysis must rest on the interests of the same-sex couple or lesbian patient, 
reviewing the availability of alternatives and the effect that allowing an 
exemption will have on the purpose of the laws promoting same-sex rights.  It 
is difficult to pinpoint the precise dividing line between situations that call for 
a religious exemption and those that do not.  In applying any sort of religious 
exemption, courts will need to define the scope of the exemption as applied to 
the facts of a particular case.  This section suggests that when defining the 
scope of exemptions, courts and legislatures should consider the nature of the 
activity that the religious objector seeks an exemption from, which indicates 
the burden on the religious objector; the centrality of the activity and/or the 
objection to the objector’s religious views, which points to the burden on the 
objector and the sincerity of religious belief; and the availability of alternative 
service providers, which goes to whether the obligations otherwise imposed on 
 
 76 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 87 (2d ed. 1995) 
(providing the text of debates over drafts of the First Amendment religion clauses in which representatives 
remark on the depth of the convictions of conscientious objectors to military service as a reason for providing 
exemptions to service). 
 77 While the restaurant owner and doctor in these examples might argue that by serving a same-sex 
couple he or she is facilitating the same-sex relationship, these activities are distinguished from “true” second 
order conflicts because they do not play a direct role in forming or legitimizing a same-sex relationship or in 
establishing a family.  These are also the types of activities that were at the heart of the application of Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006), in cases like Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–97 
(1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243–44 (1964). 
 78 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 100 (providing examples of individuals like florists and bakers who 
might refuse to participate in a same-sex ceremony). 
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the religious objector are the least restrictive means of achieving the goal of 
promoting the rights of same-sex couples. 
II. THE POLICIES AND PRECEDENTS FOR RECOGNIZING RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTIONS 
Some scholars have argued that religious exemptions undermine the force 
and purpose of the law—particularly in the area of civil rights, which 
encompasses the rights of same-sex couples in certain states—and, therefore, 
should not be allowed.79  This Part offers reasons for providing at least some 
exemptions for religious objectors to same-sex relationships.  Section A 
explains why advocates for both same-sex rights and religious liberty should 
favor limited exemptions for strategic policy reasons.  Section B shows that the 
recognition of exemptions would not be a radical departure from historical 
tradition or from the historical understanding of religious liberty in the United 
States. 
A. Policy Reasons for Providing Religious Exemptions 
Advocates of religious liberty seek exemptions from laws promoting same-
sex rights because these exemptions would protect the freedom of religious 
professionals and organizations to act in accordance with their religious 
beliefs.  Under this view, exemptions would enhance religious freedom and 
promote the free exercise of religion and religious pluralism, ideals that have 
been valued since the founding of the United States.80  However, religious 
individuals and organizations might not be the only beneficiaries of such 
exemptions. 
Society as a whole may benefit from ensuring that private individuals and 
organizations like doctors and adoption agencies are not forced to discontinue 
services because they refuse to act against deeply held religious beliefs.81  
Same-sex couples could actually benefit as well.  A major source of objection 
to same-sex rights is that permitting same-sex marriage, or promoting same-
 
 79 See Lin, supra note 22, at 721 (“[E]xemptions for religious free exercise from sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination statutes undermine the two underlying purposes of the statutes: (1) eliminating from 
decisionmaking . . . irrelevant moral objections to somebody’s sexual orientation; and (2) making a symbolic 
gesture of acceptance and tolerance of homosexuality.”). 
 80 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 41 (referring to “free exercise” and “religious pluralism” as values 
underlying eighteenth-century American ideas regarding religious liberty). 
 81 See supra Part I.B.2a. 
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sex rights, will severely limit the religious liberty of those who disagree with 
such relationships.82  Limited exemptions would demonstrate that the battle 
over same-sex rights need not be winner-take-all.83  Religious exemptions 
could decrease opposition to same-sex relationships, resulting in more rights 
for same-sex couples in states that currently refuse to recognize such rights.  In 
most cases, both groups can enjoy their rights without detracting from the 
other.84  Thus, while exemptions would have some effect on the ability of 
same-sex couples to choose their service providers, exemptions might serve as 
a catalyst for recognizing new rights for same-sex couples.85 
B. The Historical Precedent for Religious Exemptions 
The sections below describe the historical precedent for recognizing both 
statutory and constitutional religious exemptions.  Recounting this history 
serves two purposes.  First, it demonstrates that religious exemptions from 
laws and government policies have been both legitimate and effective, and, 
second, it serves as a reminder of the value that the United States has placed on 
freedom of conscience as a component of religious freedom since 
independence.86  Indeed, one might argue that the values underlying religious 
exemptions are woven into the very fabric of our system of government.87 
1. Historical Recognition of Statutory Exemptions 
The United States has a long tradition of statutory exemptions for those 
who are conscientiously opposed to specific government programs.  
Exemptions for conscientious objectors to military service pre-date the 
Constitution.88  The Framers considered including an Amendment in the Bill of 
 
 82 See Stern, supra note 52 (outlining the consequences of recognizing same-sex rights for religious 
individuals and organizations). 
 83 See Vischer, supra note 22, at 84 (referring to the winner-take-all approach in the pharmacist arena). 
 84 One element of the strict scrutiny test outlined infra Part V would take into account whether other 
sources of service are available. 
 85 See supra Part I.A.2 (showing that only six states recognize same-sex marriage, and less than half 
provide protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 86 See WITTE, supra note 76, at xxi (referring to “liberty of conscience” as a principle of religious 
freedom recognized by the founders). 
 87 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 632 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
enforcement of the oath requirement at issue in the case should be viewed not only as “contrary . . . to the 
specific intent of the Congress but as repugnant to the fundamental principle of representative government”). 
 88 See KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 49 (2006) (“[E]xcusing people from 
military service remains the quintessential exemption, against which we can compare many other conflicts of 
legal duty and religious conscience.”). 
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Rights to protect conscientious objectors to military service but ultimately 
concluded that it was a function of the states or the responsibility of Congress 
to provide for such exemptions.89  Since that time, Congress has provided 
exemptions for religious objectors to military service through various statutes, 
including the 1864 Draft Act, the Draft Act of 1917 and the 1940 Selective 
Service Act.90  The Court has played an active role in defining the scope of 
these statutory exemptions91 and has also recognized, as an extension of the 
exemptions from military service, an implicit exemption from the oath 
requirement of the Nationality Act for immigrants who object to swearing an 
oath to bear arms for the United States.92  In addition to providing exemptions 
for objectors to military service, Congress has more recently provided religious 
exemptions to other laws in a variety of contexts such as abortion, employment 
discrimination, and taxes.93 
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Exemptions 
The jurisprudence surrounding the Free Exercise Clause is heavily 
concerned with whether individuals should be exempt from government laws 
or policies that affect the practice of their religion, and the Supreme Court has 
recognized such exemptions in certain contexts.94  The Court has not, however, 
directly addressed whether the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions for 
 
 89 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 81–87 (providing the text of the draft amendment and the debates 
surrounding the religion clauses in general).  The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the 
Constitution would provide an exemption for religious conscientious objectors to military service, but it has 
indicated in dicta that it would not.  See GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 59 (noting that the Court stated in 
dicta in Macintosh that the Free Exercise Clause did not confer such a right to objectors absent legislation;, and 
noting that the Court in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), stated that selective service objectors 
did not have a constitutional right of exemption; , but also pointing out that the Court has not yet decided the 
ultimate issue of whether religious objectors would enjoy an exemption derived from the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
 90 GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 50–51. 
 91 Id. at 59–67.  See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreting the phrases “religious 
training and belief” and “belief in a Supreme Being” used in the Universal Military Training and Service Act); 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (extending the conscientious objector exemption under the 
Military Service Act to individuals whose ethical or moral beliefs prevent them from serving in the military). 
 92 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 93 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of exemptions involving abortion and employment discrimination.  
For a description of other exemptions enacted by Congress, see Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional 
Hopper: A Long Wish List of Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A20. 
 94 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of state compulsory 
school-attendance laws to Amish parents violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that a state’s denial of unemployment 
compensation to a claimant who quit his job because it required him to participate in the production of 
materials used to manufacture arms, in violation of his religious beliefs, violated the Free Exercise Clause). 
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religious objectors to civil laws promoting the private rights of individuals.  
The debates and drafts of the Framers have led scholars to different 
conclusions as to whether the Framers intended to include in the Free Exercise 
Clause a right of conscience that would allow exemptions from civil statutes.95  
The evidence regarding the original intent of the Framers is inconclusive and 
perhaps irrelevant since the Framers most likely did not envision the array of 
civil statutes that has accompanied the growth of the modern administrative 
state.96  Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on free exercise claims has varied significantly over time,97 with 
some of the Court’s decisions suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause could 
provide exemptions from civil statutes and others suggesting the opposite.  The 
Court’s earliest cases suggest that the Free Exercise Clause did not 
contemplate exemptions from government laws or policies.98  However, the 
Court began employing a broader interpretation and applying heightened forms 
of scrutiny to free exercise claims in 1940, when the clause was first applied to 
the states.99 
The Court’s post-1940 decisions demonstrate a concern over requiring 
individuals to participate in activities that go against their religious beliefs and 
a willingness to recognize exemptions from such requirements.  For example, 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that a 
local board of education’s policy requiring students to either salute the flag or 
face expulsion violated the First Amendment rights of students who, based on 
their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses, believed that saluting the flag would 
violate the biblical commandment against worshipping a “graven image.”100  
Although it is unclear whether the Court would have extended its decision in 
 
 95 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15 (1990) (arguing that the Framers contemplated religious exemptions from 
statutes).  But see Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (critiquing McConnell’s argument and concluding that the 
evidence does not establish the Framers’ intent to provide religious exemptions from civil statutes). 
 96 See WITTE, supra note 76, at 163 (referring to the pluralization of religions and the proliferation of 
welfare laws in the United States). 
 97 See id. at 146–52 (explaining the variety of approaches and levels of scrutiny that the Court has 
applied to free exercise cases since 1940). 
 98 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding the constitutionality of laws 
prohibiting polygamy and noting that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices”). 
 99 WITTE, supra note 76 at 149. 
 100 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626–29 (1943). 
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Barnette to other contexts,101 the decision is significant because the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to refuse to participate in an activity that 
violates one’s religious beliefs.102  The Court’s opinion evidences the value 
placed on freedom of religious conscience and freedom of expression as means 
to maintaining a free and peaceful society.103 
Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court first applied strict 
scrutiny to a free exercise claim,104 the Court emphasized the gravity of forcing 
an individual to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”105  According to the Court, 
this choice “puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as 
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”106 
Although they are not sufficient to establish a constitutional right of 
exemption for all religious objectors, cases like Barnette and Sherbert illustrate 
the importance of protecting individuals from government laws or policies that 
compel them to act against their religious beliefs.  Even where the Court has 
found that no constitutional right of exemption exists for a particular category 
of religious claimants, the Court has emphasized the appropriateness of 
providing statutory exemptions.107  Though the current test for free exercise 
claims, set forth in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, will in most instances not recognize exemptions for religious 
 
 101 See id. at 630, 634 (emphasizing that the rule infringed on the plaintiff’s right to speak his own mind 
and noting that the plaintiff’s refusal to salute the flag had little bearing on the rights of others). 
 102 The concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas indicates that religious claimants should be 
required to act in discordance with their beliefs only in certain situations.  See id. at 643–44 (Black & Douglas, 
JJ., concurring) (“Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from responsibility to conduct 
themselves obediently to laws which are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave 
and pressingly imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibition, merely regulate time, place or 
manner of religious activity.”). 
 103 See id. at 637 (majority opinion) (noting that to enforce the Bill of Rights “is not to choose weak 
government over strong government.  It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind 
in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous 
end.”). 
 104 WITTE, supra note 76, at 149. 
 105 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963). 
 106 Id. at 404.  The plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits after she lost her job because she refused 
to violate her religious beliefs by working on Saturday.  The Court concluded that the denial of unemployment 
benefits violated her free exercise rights.  Id. at 403. 
 107 See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (recognizing congressional power to enact protections 
for a limited class of individuals who object to military service for religious reasons). 
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objectors,108 the Court in Smith also recognized the role of legislatures in 
providing broader protection for religious liberty.109 
In short, the current battle over same-sex rights suggests the need for a 
policy that can relieve the tension between same-sex rights and religious 
liberty.  The historical precedents of recognizing both statutory and 
constitutional exemptions for other religious objectors further demonstrate 
both the importance and feasibility of providing exemptions for religious 
objectors to same-sex rights. 
III.  THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROVIDE EXEMPTIONS 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”110  By 
requiring an individual to participate in an activity that is contrary to his or her 
religious beliefs, such as the legitimization of same-sex marriage or the 
establishment of a family for same-sex couples, the state is arguably requiring 
the individual to affirm something that is contrary to his or her religious beliefs 
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.111  Although prior to 1990, the 
Supreme Court might have agreed with such a broad interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court’s current interpretation is narrower in 
scope.112  Section A describes the current scope of free exercise rights under 
the First Amendment.  Given the limitations of First Amendment jurisprudence 
in addressing the tension between same-sex marriage and the exercise of 
religious conscience, sections B and C examine alternative federal and state 
constitutional authority for religious exemptions, concluding that none of these 
authorities sufficiently protect religious objectors. 
 
 108 See infra Part III.A. 
 109 See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting 
that it is “not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental 
peyote use”). 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 111 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Official 
compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one’s religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom of worship.”). 
 112 For a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence, see WITTE, supra note 76, at 143–69 and GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 27–34. 
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A. The Current State of Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
The current test for determining whether a state action violates the Free 
Exercise Clause arises out of Smith.113  The subsections below discuss: (1) the 
test of “general and neutral applicability” arising out of Smith and the 
subsequent applications of this standard by the Supreme Court and lower 
courts; and (2) two specific state and lower court cases applying the Smith test 
to contexts involving religious objectors. 
1. Smith and the “General and Neutrally Applicable” Standard 
In Smith, decided in 1990, the Supreme Court held that “the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability.’”114  The plaintiffs in Smith had been 
denied unemployment compensation because they were fired for using 
peyote.115  Despite the plaintiffs’ assertion that they used the peyote in 
connection with a religious ceremony of the Native American Church,116 the 
Court held that the denial of unemployment compensation did not violate their 
free exercise rights because the state criminal statute prohibiting the use of 
peyote was a valid exercise of the police power and was of neutral and general 
applicability.117  The Court did not require the state to provide a compelling 
interest for the law or the absence of exemptions.118  Though the Court in 
Smith stated that its decision did not overrule prior cases, the result and the test 
applied in Smith diverged from prior unemployment compensation cases.119 
The Court in Smith did not do away with the strict scrutiny test altogether 
but instead cabined the application of strict scrutiny to laws that are either not 
 
 113 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 114 Id. at 879. 
 115 Id. at 874. 
 116 Id. at 874, 876. 
 117 Id. at 882. 
 118 Id. at 885.  For an example of how the Court has applied the compelling interest standard in the 
context of free exercise, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963).  The Court found that no 
compelling state interest supported the government’s denial of unemployment compensation to the plaintiff, 
who was discharged from her employment because, in accordance with her religious beliefs, she refused to 
work on Saturday.  In determining whether there was a compelling state interest, the Court noted, “in this 
highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion 
for permissible limitation.’”  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 119 Compare Smith, with Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Sherbert, 374 
U.S. 398; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).  In the three latter cases, 
the Court found that denial of unemployment compensation to individuals who were unemployed because of 
their religious objections to work duties violated the Free Exercise Clause. 
EAST GALLEYSFINAL 10/30/2009  3:13:53 PM 
2009] I OBJECT: THE RLUIPA AS A MODEL 281 
neutral or not generally applicable.120  While the post-Smith analysis for free 
exercise claims therefore turns on the threshold issue of whether a law is 
neutral and generally applicable, the application of this standard by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts has yielded conflicting results.  In Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court, applying 
the Smith test, struck down the application of a Florida ordinance that 
prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals.121  The Court indicated that the 
process of determining whether a law is of general and neutral applicability 
extends beyond the strict language of the statute, noting that although the 
Florida animal cruelty statute at issue seemed neutral on its face, the state 
applied the statute to allow almost all types of animal slaughter except ritual 
animal sacrifice.122  Because the application of the statute “singled out” 
religious practice, the statute was not general and neutrally applicable.123  The 
Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and held that Florida’s interest in 
protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals could have been 
addressed through less restrictive means such as regulations regarding disposal 
of organic waste.124 
While the Court in Lukumi appeared to clarify the standard for free exercise 
claims, ten years later, in Locke v. Davey, the Court confused the standard by 
holding that a Washington state statute, which explicitly excluded students 
pursuing a “degree in theology” from the state’s honor scholarship program, 
did not require strict scrutiny.125  The Court contrasted this provision with the 
statute at issue in Lukumi, arguing that “[i]n the present case, the State’s 
disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind.  It imposes 
neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or   
rite . . . .  The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of 
instruction.”126  Having found no presumption against the constitutionality of 
the statute, the Court upheld the Washington law.127  Justice Scalia, who 
authored the majority opinion in Smith, dissented, arguing that the majority in 
 
 120 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1993) (applying 
strict scrutiny where the law was applied in a discriminatory manner). 
 121 Id. 
 122 See id. at 537 (noting that hunting, euthanasia, and pest control were allowed). 
 123 Id. at 538. 
 124 Id. at 538–39. 
 125 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715–16 (2004). 
 126 Id. at 720–21. 
 127 Id. at 725. 
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Locke departed from precedent by endorsing a “public benefits program that 
facially discriminates against religion.”128 
The vague definition of general and neutral applicability offered by the 
Supreme Court has also led to varied interpretations by lower courts.  In 
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania129 and Falwell v. Miller,130 the courts found that 
the statutes at issue were not neutral and generally applicable, and thus were 
subject to strict scrutiny.  The state constitutional provision at issue in Falwell 
was found to be neither neutral nor generally applicable because on its face it 
discriminated against churches by providing that churches could not 
incorporate under state law.131  In Blackhawk, the court found the statute 
neutral on its face but said the law was applied in a non-neutral way that 
discriminated against religious individuals.132  In each case, the court held that 
the statute failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and therefore violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.133  In contrast to Falwell and Blackhawk, in Wirzberger v. 
Galvin, the First Circuit found that a Massachusetts constitutional provision 
barring initiative amendments to the state constitution related to “religion, 
religious practices or religious institutions”134 did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.135  The court provided only a brief analysis of the plaintiffs’ free 
exercise claims, offering several reasons for upholding the statute136 but failing 
to explain why a statute that specifically singles out initiatives related to 
“religion, religious practices or religious institutions” should be considered 
neutral and generally applicable.137 
Cases such as Locke, Lukumi, Blackhawk, and Wirzburger demonstrate that 
through its decision in Smith, the Court has not only reduced the general 
 
 128 Id. at 726 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
 129 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 130 203 F. Supp. 2d 624 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
 131 Id. at 628, 630–31. 
 132 Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 209. 
 133 See id. at 214 (noting that even if the state had a compelling interest, the application of the statute was 
not the least restrictive means of promoting that interest); Falwell, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 632 (holding that since 
the state did not offer a compelling interest, the provision failed the strict scrutiny test). 
 134 Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 
2, §2). 
 135 Id. at 282. 
 136 See id. at 280–82 (concluding that the provision at issue did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because it did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ freedom of religious belief; did not distinguish among particular 
religious groups or affiliations, and instead applied equally to all initiatives bearing any relation to religion and 
to all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs; did not prohibit religious conduct or religious practices; and 
was not motivated by religious animus). 
 137 Id. at 275 (citing MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, §2). 
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standard for free exercise cases from one of strict scrutiny to one of general 
and neutral applicability, it has also failed to articulate a clear test for 
determining general and neutral applicability.  The Court’s current standard 
thus offers little protection or predictability for free exercise claimants.  The 
section below attempts to define the scope of protection that the Smith standard 
provides for religious objectors in particular, concluding that while the Free 
Exercise Clause might still offer some protection for religious objectors, it is 
severely limited and is unlikely to arise in the context of laws establishing 
same-sex rights. 
2. Application of the Smith Standard in Religious Objector Cases 
Two cases illustrate the limited scope of protection available to religious 
objectors under the Free Exercise Clause.  The first, Stormans, Inc. v. 
Selecky,138 which arose in the context of pharmacists’ objections to dispensing 
oral contraceptives, shows that the Smith standard may protect religious 
objectors from liability when the primary intent of the statute is to restrict the 
rights of religious objectors, but such an intent can be difficult to prove.  North 
Coast, the second case (already discussed in the Introduction), illustrates the 
failure of the Smith standard to protect religious objectors from liability under 
civil statutes that give rights to same-sex couples. 
a. Stormans: Legislative Intent to Restrict Religious Objectors 
Over the past few years, a number of states have passed laws allowing 
pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for oral contraceptives because of 
religious or moral objections.139  In 2006, Washington’s state Board of 
Pharmacy issued proposed rules addressing, among other things, pharmacists’ 
refusal to dispense lawfully prescribed medication.140  After receiving public 
comments, the Board adopted new regulations in 2007 that required 
pharmacies to fill all lawful prescriptions.141  The regulations exempt 
 
 138 571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 139 For an overview of state legislation regarding the rights and duties of pharmacists, see NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE CLAUSES: LAWS AND LEGISLATION (2009), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/ConscienceClauses.htm. 
 140 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 964.  According to the district court, one of the early proposals would have 
allowed state-licensed pharmacists to refuse to dispense medication as long as the pharmacy or pharmacist did 
not “obstruct a patient’s effort to obtain lawfully prescribed drugs or devices.”  Stormans v. Selecky, 524 F. 
Supp. 2d 1245, 1250–51 (W.D. Wash. 2007), rev’d, 571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 141 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 965–66.  A statement accompanying the regulations said that a pharmacy may 
accommodate an individual pharmacist’s religious or moral objections, but the pharmacy itself may not refuse 
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pharmacies from filling prescriptions for certain reasons, such as lack of 
payment, suspicion that the prescription is fraudulent, lack of necessary 
equipment, or unavailability; but the regulations do not provide an exemption 
for religious objectors.142  In response, a group of pharmacists filed for a 
preliminary injunction, alleging that the regulations violated their right to free 
exercise under the U.S. Constitution.143 
The district court decision in Stormans v. Selecky and the Ninth Circuit’s 
later reversal of that decision show that it will be difficult for religious 
objectors to claim that a civil statute or regulation is anything but neutral and 
generally applicable.  The district court applied the Smith analysis to enjoin 
Washington’s “duty to fill” requirement,144 on the ground that there was 
sufficient evidence that the newly imposed rule was not a valid law of neutral 
and general applicability.145  Rather, it was passed to limit the free exercise 
rights of pharmacists by requiring them to act contrary to their religious 
beliefs.146 
The district court noted that the regulations were facially neutral, applying 
to all pharmacists and all types of medication,147 but it looked beyond the plain 
language of the rule in evaluating whether it was neutral and generally 
applicable.  Based on the history behind the rule and the news releases 
referring to complaints about pharmacists who refused to fill emergency 
contraceptives the court concluded that the evidence “strongly suggests that the 
overriding objective of the subject regulations was, to the degree possible, to 
eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of dispensing 
medication.”148  The court further determined that the regulations were not 
generally applicable, noting, “[f]rom the very beginning of this issue, it 
appears that the focus of the debate has been on Plan B and on religious 
 
to dispense the medication.  Id. at 966–67.  Individual pharmacist plaintiffs, however, claimed that the absence 
of a moral or religious exemption for pharmacies would cause them to quit or lose their jobs.  Id. at 967. 
 142 Id. at 966 n.5. 
 143 Id. at 1255. 
 144 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.  For a discussion of the debate over pharmacist refusal clauses, see 
Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses 
for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469 (2006), and for a discussion of the rights and obligations at issue in 
“duty to fill” laws, see Norey, supra note 64. 
 145 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1259–62. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1257. 
 148 Id. at 1259. 
EAST GALLEYSFINAL 10/30/2009  3:13:53 PM 
2009] I OBJECT: THE RLUIPA AS A MODEL 285 
objection to dispensing that drug.”149  Finally, the court noted that there was no 
evidence that any individual in the State of Washington had been unable to 
obtain an emergency contraceptive because of a pharmacist’s refusal to 
dispense the medication,150 ultimately concluding that the evidence did not 
support the state’s contention that the regulations advanced a compelling state 
interest and were narrowly tailored for that purpose.151 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion, on the ground that 
the legal standard for preliminary injunctions had changed since the district 
court issued its opinion.  The Ninth Circuit further held that the district court 
erred in finding that the regulations were not neutral and generally 
applicable.152  According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court should not have 
considered the legislative history of the challenged regulation.  It noted that the 
district court relied on the Lukumi decision in its consideration of legislative 
history, but only Justices Kennedy and Stevens joined the portion of the 
Lukumi opinion discussing legislative history.153 
The analysis of the district court in Stormans cautions states against 
intentionally limiting the free exercise of religious individuals and 
organizations in favor of other groups or classes.154  However, the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion shows that religious objectors are unlikely to succeed in 
challenging the constitutionality of such state laws..  One might question the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that legislative history may not be incorporated into 
a free exercise analysis,155 but the court’s decision highlights an important 
point—unless courts can point to legislative history evidencing a clear intent to 
limit free exercise of religion, most civil statutes and regulations will be 
deemed a neutral and generally applicable law, subject only to rational basis 
scrutiny under Smith.  Whether it is because courts are unwilling to review 
legislative history or because that legislative history does not evidence a clear 
intent to prohibit free exercise, most civil statutes will be deemed neutral and 
 
 149 Id. at 1260.  For a description of Plan B, a hormonal emergency contraceptive, see Stormans v. 
Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 150 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
 151 Id. at 1264.  Because the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, the court 
granted a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 1266. 
 152 Stormans, 571 F.3d at 977–79. 
 153 Id. at 981–82. 
 154 Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (noting that the policy was not neutral when enacted with the 
objective of preventing pharmacists from exercising their rights of conscience). 
 155 The court itself notes, “[w]e may discern with certainty only that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas did not join Part II.A.2 of the opinion due to disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s use of 
legislative history.”  Stormans, 571 F.3d at 982 n.13. 
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generally applicable unless applied in a discriminatory manner.  North Coast 
illustrates this point in the context of civil laws affording rights to same-sex 
couples. 
b. North Coast: Civil Rights Statutes and Religious Objectors 
While the decision in Stormans shows that the Free Exercise Clause might 
still place some limits on state actions that compel professionals to perform 
duties contrary to their religious beliefs, the decision in North Coast 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Smith test to resolve most of the conflicts 
that arise between laws protecting same-sex couples and the freedom of 
religious objectors.  Recall that in North Coast, a lesbian woman brought suit 
against two doctors at a fertility clinic who refused to perform IUI for her 
because doing so would have violated their religious beliefs.156  The plaintiff 
claimed that the doctors violated her rights under California’s civil rights 
statute, and the doctors raised defenses of free exercise under the federal and 
state constitutions.  Applying the Smith test, the California Supreme Court held 
that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is a valid law of neutral and general 
applicability.157  It therefore, found that the application of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act did not violate the defendants’ right of free exercise.  As a result, if 
the defendants’ refusal to perform IUI for the plaintiff was based on the 
plaintiff’s sexual orientation,158 the defendants violated the civil rights statute 
and are therefore liable to the plaintiff.159  The opinion in North Coast 
demonstrates that, in applying the Smith test, courts are not likely to find that 
the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from laws that were passed to 
protect the rights of a separate class of individuals rather than to explicitly 
prevent the religious or free exercise rights of another class of individuals.160  
 
 156 For an in-depth discussion of the legal rights and duties implicated in the newly emerging field of 
Artificial Reproductive Technology, including IUI, see Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: 
Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18 (2008). 
 157 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal. 
2008).  The court’s analysis is brief in comparison to the analysis performed in most of the other cases 
referenced in this Part. 
 158 The defendants maintained that their refusal to perform IUI for the plaintiff was based on her marital 
status rather than her sexual orientation.  The trial court determined that there was a dispute of material fact on 
this issue that must be resolved at trial.  Thus, the issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the 
defendants could assert a valid First Amendment defense if their actions were based on plaintiff’s sexual 
orientation.  Id. at 963, 970. 
 159 Id. at 970. 
 160 Although North Coast involved a statutory right, there is no reason to suspect that courts would apply 
a different analysis where there is a state constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples.  The one 
distinction is that when bringing a constitutional claim, a plaintiff might be required to show that the private 
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As long as legislative history emphasizes the rights of the protected group 
rather than targeting religious objectors, the law will be viewed as neutral and 
generally applicable. 
B. The Limited Promise of Other U.S. Constitutional Provisions 
In the wake of Smith, plaintiffs might invoke other constitutional provisions 
to protect religious conduct.  These other provisions may be used in one of two 
ways, neither of which offers much promise for religious objectors.  The first is 
by pairing a free exercise claim with a claim under another constitutional 
provision.  The Court in Smith suggested that even where the law at issue is 
neutral and generally applicable, such “hybrid rights” might justify a higher 
level of scrutiny than that applied to a free exercise claim alone.161  The scope 
of this protection is limited, however, because lower federal courts have been 
hesitant to recognize the existence of other constitutional rights in free exercise 
cases unless these other constitutional rights are obviously implicated.  No 
such correlative right is obvious in the case of religious objectors who refuse to 
serve same-sex couples.162 
Rather than pairing another constitutional right with a free exercise right, 
claimants may choose to invoke an alternative provision of the Constitution 
that would require the court to apply a higher level of scrutiny.  The Due 
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are two potential sources, but 
neither offers a ready solution for religious objectors.  At least one scholar has 
argued that the Court should recognize a general right of conscience under the 
Due Process Clause that would require courts to balance claims of competing 
interests such as those arising in the context of same-sex marriage.163  While 
 
individual or organization alleged to have engaged in discrimination is a state actor.  While it is doubtful that 
the plaintiff in North Coast could have established that the doctors were state actors, the question of whether 
clergy members are state actors in performing or refusing to perform marriages is a much closer issue because 
they are licensed by the state to solemnize marriages.  See Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against Religion, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 20, at 103, 
113–16. 
 161 See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The 
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved . . . the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”). 
 162 See, e.g., id. (noting that although a hybrid of constitutional rights may raise the level of scrutiny, no 
other constitutional rights were at issue in the case); North Coast, 189 P.3d at 967 (rejecting defendants’ 
claims that their refusal to perform IUI was grounded in both free speech and free exercise rights under the 
First Amendment). 
 163 See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 
20, at 123, 138 (arguing for a right of conscience under the Due Process Clause). 
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this approach would serve as an effective way of resolving conflicts between 
the right to same-sex marriage and the right to free exercise, it would require a 
significant reformulation of the Court’s due process jurisprudence.164  It seems 
unlikely that the Court would be willing to expand the scope of the Due 
Process Clause to engage in a balancing test that it was unwilling to recognize 
under the First Amendment.  A claimant could bring a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause,165 arguing either (1) that the law at issue discriminates 
against a protected class on its face or in application, and therefore requires 
strict scrutiny, or (2) that the law lacks a rational basis and is therefore 
unconstitutional.166  However, if the allegation is that the provision 
discriminates on the basis of religion, the analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause will generally mirror the analysis under the neutral and general 
applicability test of Smith in that both tests would apply rational basis scrutiny 
to a law that is neutral on its face and in application, and both would apply 
strict scrutiny to a law that discriminates against religion.167  Thus, like Smith, 
the Equal Protection Clause will almost always warrant rational basis review 
for civil laws protecting same-sex couples like the civil rights statute in North 
Coast. 
C. State Constitutional Interpretations: An Ineffective Solution 
As demonstrated below, in several states, courts have recognized that the 
free exercise clause—or its equivalent—in the state constitution provides 
greater protection to religious claimants than the First Amendment.  While it is 
notable that some states provide greater constitutional protection for the free 
exercise of religion than the protection afforded under the First Amendment 
since Smith, in practice the application of heightened scrutiny does not 
automatically yield different outcomes for free exercise claimants.  For 
example, in Rupert v. City of Portland, the Supreme Court of Maine subjected 
 
 164 For an overview of fundamental rights recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, see CHEMERINSKY supra, note 35 at 791–919. 
 165 See Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 467 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (addressing claims under the 
Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Equal Protection Clause). 
 166 For a basic overview of the appropriate analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, see CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 35, at 669–74. 
 167 The one distinction between the two tests arises where courts require the plaintiff to show a substantial 
burden before implementing the Smith analysis.  In these instances, a claimant might win under equal 
protection but not under free exercise.  See Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of 
Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987–88 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding an equal protection violation but rejecting 
plaintiff’s free exercise claim where a zoning ordinance was applied to religious organizations in a different 
manner).  The court in Vineyard notes the oddity of this result.  Id. 
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a seizure of drug paraphernalia to strict scrutiny under the state free exercise 
clause.168  The court ultimately upheld the seizure, finding that it served a 
compelling government interest and was the least restrictive means 
available.169  Similarly, courts in Washington have recognized that the free 
exercise clause of the Washington Constitution affords more protection than 
the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.170  However, as the Supreme 
Court of Maine found in Rupert, the Washington court in State v. Balzer found 
that the state law prohibiting possession of marijuana satisfied a compelling 
government interest and was the least restrictive means for promoting that 
interest.171  The court, therefore, held that there was no free exercise 
violation.172 
The free exercise claims of those who object to same-sex marriage are 
analogous to the free exercise claims brought by landlords who refuse to rent 
to unmarried heterosexual couples.  Even in states that apply the same or 
similar forms of heightened scrutiny, landlords have encountered mixed results 
in court.  The supreme court of at least one state, Minnesota, has held that a 
landlord’s refusal to rent to an unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couple did 
not violate the couple’s rights and was protected under the state constitution.173  
Although State v. French demonstrates that state constitutional provisions may 
protect religious objectors, the reasoning of the court in that case may not 
necessarily apply to a situation involving discrimination against same-sex 
couples.  Because Minnesota law prohibited fornication, the state supreme 
court reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to include 
unmarried, cohabiting couples within the definition of “marital status” under 
the state antidiscrimination statute, and thus the state did not have a compelling 
interest in prohibiting discrimination against such couples.174  However, 
French was decided in 1990, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision thirteen 
years later in Lawrence has eradicated any analogous argument regarding 
cohabitation of same-sex couples.175 
 
 168 Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992). 
 169 Id. 
 170 State v. Balzer, 954 P.2d 931, 935–36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 940–42. 
 173 State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7–9 (Minn. 1990). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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Further, the French decision stands in contrast to the holdings in similar 
cases in other states.  For example, courts in Alaska176 and California177 have 
held that landlords cannot claim a religious exemption from state housing 
statutes even if the state constitution requires application of a higher level of 
scrutiny than the U.S. Constitution.  The Supreme Court of California found 
that an antidiscrimination provision of a state housing statute did not burden 
the landlord’s free exercise rights because the landlord’s religion did not 
require her to rent out apartments.178  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
held that although the state’s anti-discrimination law did burden the landlord’s 
free exercise rights, the state had a compelling interest in prohibiting housing 
discrimination against unmarried cohabiting couples.179  Other states have 
similarly held that whether an antidiscrimination provision of a state housing 
law violates the free exercise rights of landlords depends on whether the state 
can establish a compelling interest for the antidiscrimination provision.180 
North Coast further illustrates that applying heightened scrutiny to free 
exercise claims under a state constitution will not guarantee a victory for 
religious objectors.  In addition to dismissing the defendants’ First Amendment 
defense, the court in North Coast determined that the defendants had no valid 
defense under the California Constitution.181  The court concluded that even if 
strict scrutiny were to apply to cases arising under the state constitution, the 
state still had a compelling interest in “ensuring full and equal access to 
medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation,” and the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act provided the least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal.182 
This holding regarding the California Constitution is significant when 
examining the most effective channels for enhancing protection of religious 
objectors to same-sex relationships.  The court’s opinion demonstrates the 
state’s ability to circumvent efforts to protect religious objectors through 
 
 176 Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). 
 177 Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). 
 178 Smith, 913 P.2d at 929, 931 (holding that even if the state constitution required a higher level of 
scrutiny than the U.S. Constitution, the landlord would have no valid objection because the higher level of 
scrutiny would be the same scrutiny applied under RFRA, and under that standard the landlord still could not 
demonstrate a burden on free exercise). 
 179 Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281–84. 
 180 Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 459 Mich. 1235 (Mich. 
1999). 
 181 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 968 (Cal. 
2008). 
 182 Id.  The court failed to provide a detailed analysis of the narrow tailoring prong, concluding rather 
summarily that the statute is the least restrictive means available. 
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statutes that merely raise the level of scrutiny applied to all categories of free 
exercise claims.183  Even where a higher level of scrutiny applies, the court 
may find that the state has a compelling interest in preserving the right to 
same-sex marriage or prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.184  For this reason, laws such as RLUIPA, discussed below, which 
target specific activities or categories of claimants, might be more successful in 
protecting the conscience rights of religious claimants. 
IV.  POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: THE RANGE OF STATUTORY 
RESPONSES TO SMITH 
Federal and state responses to Smith illustrate the varied ways to extend 
greater statutory protections to religious objectors.  Although the Court in 
Smith was unsympathetic to the claimants’ argument that their First 
Amendment rights had been violated, the Court made it clear that states and 
Congress are free to go beyond the minimal requirements of the U.S. 
Constitution and provide greater protection for the religious freedom of 
individuals.185  These protections are generally found in: (1) statute-specific 
exemptions for religious objectors; (2) state or federal laws that effectively 
require the application of strict scrutiny to burdens on free exercise; and (3) 
RLUIPA, which raises the level of scrutiny for two specific types of claims—
those made by prisoners against state and federal governments, and those 
regarding land use regulations. 
A. Statute-Specific Exemptions 
As noted in Smith, several states recognized statutory exemptions to state 
controlled substance laws prior to the Court’s decision.186  After Smith, other 
states passed laws exempting the use of peyote in religious ceremonies from 
state bans on controlled substances.187  For example, Oregon law now 
explicitly provides for an affirmative defense where peyote is used in the 
 
 183 See id. (arguing that even if a higher level of scrutiny applies under the state constitution, the 
defendants’ free exercise claims would still fail). 
 184 See id. 
 185 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 186 See id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3402(B)(1)–(3) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3) 
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (West 1989)). 
 187 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.840 (West Supp. 2009). 
EAST GALLEYSFINAL 10/30/2009  3:13:53 PM 
292 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
practice of a religious belief in a manner that is not dangerous to the user or 
others in close proximity.188 
As demonstrated in the discussion above regarding the history of religious 
conscience rights, the recognition of explicit statutory exemptions from certain 
laws is not a recent phenomenon.189  In addition to the statutory exemptions for 
conscientious objectors to military service and oath-swearing mentioned 
above, Congress and the states have provided exemptions to many other types 
of statutory and constitutional rights, including civil rights statutes and the 
judicially recognized rights to abortion and contraception.  Churches and other 
religious organizations generally enjoy certain exemptions from employment 
discrimination laws.190  For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides that religious organizations may use religious criteria in hiring.  
Courts also have recognized a further implicit exemption from discrimination 
laws known as the “ministerial exception,” which applies in cases that involve 
the hiring and firing of clergy.191 
The examples of exemption legislation most relevant to the conflict 
addressed here are federal and state “conscience clauses” that protect doctors 
who refuse to perform abortions and sterilization procedures and pharmacists 
who refuse to dispense contraceptives.192  For example, federal legislation, 
commonly referred to as the Church Amendment, prohibits federal funding of 
hospitals that require doctors to perform an abortion over religious 
objections.193  These state and federal conscience clauses do not currently 
provide protection for religious objectors to statutes that grant rights to same-
sex couples.  However, because the vast majority of such state statutes target 
specific procedures like abortion or sterilization, it is unlikely they can be 
invoked to address objections outside of the health care context.194  Some 
states have recently sought to extend these protections to pharmacists, but this 
issue remains controversial.195  As noted earlier, New Hampshire, Maine, and 
Vermont provide that churches and members of the clergy are not required to 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of statutory exemptions in the U.S.).  See also 
GREENAWALT, supra note 88, at 50. 
 190 Id. at 382–84. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 299 (providing excerpts from state conscience clauses). 
 193 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7 (2006) 
 194 See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 299. 
 195 See supra Part II.A.2.a (describing the controversy that erupted in the state of Washington over 
pharmacists’ rights to refuse to dispense Plan B). 
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participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies, but in Maine and Vermont these 
exemptions do not extend to other activities or other types of religious 
objectors.196  It is not clear how far New Hampshire’s protections extend.  
Although these protections do cover housing and services related to the 
marriage ceremony, they may or may not cover services like adoption and 
fertility treatments.197 
Thus far, no federal law extends protections similar to those of the Church 
Amendment to other contexts.  The outgoing administration of President 
George W. Bush issued a regulation denying federal funding to health care 
facilities that refuse to protect employees’ rights of conscience.198  The 
regulation is intended to protect doctors, nurses, and other workers who do not 
wish to participate in procedures that go against their moral or religious 
beliefs.199  This was the first rule issued by the federal government that could 
potentially protect health care providers like the doctors in North Coast, and it 
sparked controversy that led some members of Congress to consider passing a 
statute to override it.200  A statute may prove unnecessary since President 
Barack Obama’s administration has issued a proposal to rescind the Bush 
regulation.201 
The controversy surrounding the Bush regulation highlights two potential 
problems.  The first is characteristic of using regulations, as opposed to 
statutes, to provide rights in general, and the second arises from the content of 
this particular regulation.  First, executive orders and regulations can be 
overridden by legislation or easily rescinded by subsequent administrations.202  
Second, those seeking to overturn the regulation argue that it will pose barriers 
to healthcare and will prevent patients from receiving the care they want and 
 
 196 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 197 2009-61 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 2  (LexisNexis) (referring to “services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges” related to “the solemnization of a marriage, the 
celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage”). 
 198 Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or 
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88); see also Rob Stein, Rule Shields Health Workers Who Withhold Care Based on 
Beliefs, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2008, at A10 (describing the regulation and the associated controversy). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Rescission of the Regulation Entitled, “Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services 
Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law,” 74 Fed. 
Reg. 10207 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
 202 See id. (proposing to rescind the Bush regulation only a few months after its implementation); see also 
Stein supra note 198 (discussing the efforts of various members of Congress to pass legislation that would 
trump the regulation). 
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need.203  This latter issue could be addressed by including a clause requiring 
workers to act against their beliefs only in emergency situations where no one 
else could perform the necessary task.204  This consideration could be factored 
into the narrow tailoring portion of a scrutiny analysis such as the one 
proposed in Part V.  The consideration of alternatives might spur health care 
facilities to implement protocols for ensuring that in non-emergency situations, 
if there is another worker who can perform the procedure, then that worker 
performs the procedure instead. 
B. Federal and State RFRAs (Applying Strict Scrutiny Across the Board) 
In response to Smith, Congress and the states sought to implement a 
statutory scheme that would subject state and federal government actions that 
burden free exercise to strict scrutiny.  This movement began in 1993, when 
Congress passed RFRA.205  The law sought to replace the rational basis 
standard for laws of general and neutral applicability announced in Smith with 
a strict scrutiny standard.206  The subsections below reveal that the success of 
RFRA in its application to the states was short-lived.  The current patchwork 
of state RFRAs is not certain to offer protection for religious objectors either. 
1. The Failure of the Federal RFRA 
Congress relied entirely on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to pass RFRA.207  In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the 
Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states 
because Congress lacked the authority to pass the statute under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.208 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 See Wilson, supra note 20, app. at 310 (referring to state legislation that limits exemptions to non-
emergency situations). 
 205 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4. 
 206 Michael Paisner, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores and the 
Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 540 (2005). 
 207 Some scholars have argued that Congress could have relied on other powers instead of, or in addition 
to, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 575, 576 (1998) (“A constitutional strategy that diversified the underpinnings of RFRA was 
available and far preferable to what was used; stools always stand better on three or more legs than on one.”). 
 208 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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In retrospect, the Court’s decision in Boerne was not as devastating to the 
cause of religious liberty as one might think.209  A review of federal 
regulations and state attorney general decisions during the three-and-a-half-
year period between the Act’s passage and the Boerne decision demonstrates 
that RFRA had little impact on religious liberty issues.210  In a few cases, 
claimants achieved victories that they would not otherwise have secured under 
the First Amendment, but most of the cases brought under RFRA were 
unsuccessful.211  During this period, RFRA seems to have enjoyed the most 
success in cases brought by prisoners, but “even there RFRA probably did not 
create any dramatic alteration in the climate of relations between inmates and 
administrators on matters of religious liberty.”212 
Ira Lupu, who has examined the application of RFRA to states before 
Boerne, has offered various explanations for the failure of RFRA.  These range 
from the reluctance of courts to grant religious exemptions213 to the reliance by 
courts on the disjointed pre-Smith case law regarding burdens and interests in 
the context of free exercise cases.214  Courts interpreted the language requiring 
a “substantial burden” on religion in a way that “placed the bar very high for 
RFRA claimants.”215  Many of the RFRA claims decided on the merits were 
unsuccessful because the court found there was no “substantial burden” on 
religion.216  In cases where the courts did find a substantial burden, the courts 
also found a compelling government interest and then used a relatively lax 
standard for determining whether the state used the least restrictive means for 
accomplishing its stated compelling interest.217  “Rather than ask whether the 
state’s means were least restrictive . . . some courts asked whether the 
alternative, less religion-restrictive means were so expensive, cumbersome, or 
inconvenient that the state could not reasonably be expected to use them.”218 
 
 209 See Lupu, supra note 207, at 585 (concluding that between passage of RFRA and the Court’s decision 
in Boerne, “RFRA failed to produce any substantial improvement in the legal atmosphere surrounding 
religious liberty in the United States”). 
 210 Id. at 588–90. 
 211 See id. at 591 (noting that “143 of the 168 [claims brought by prisoners] produced denials of relief, 
only twenty-five claims produced grants of relief (for an overall win percentage of 15% of cases decided on 
the merits), and . . . nine of these twenty-five were in prisoner litigation, which typically involved the most 
basic infringements of religious liberty”). 
 212 Id. at 585. 
 213 Id. at 593 (“Courts seem especially uncomfortable with claims of religious exemption.”). 
 214 Id. at 594. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 596. 
 218 Id. 
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2. The Limited Success of State RFRAs 
After the Court ruled RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, 
several states passed their own versions of the law.  At least thirteen states 
have adopted an analogous state statute or constitutional provision that 
effectively applies strict scrutiny to state burdens on the free exercise of 
religion.219  The text of these provisions varies slightly from state to state, but  
every version contains a provision similar to this one: “Government may 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person is both (1) in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest [and] (2) the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”220  Thus, all state RFRA 
statutes effectively require the application of strict scrutiny in at least some 
instances where religious exercise is burdened.221 
The most significant distinctions among state statutes relate to the terms 
and definitions used to describe the type of activity protected and the level of 
burden the claimant must show for strict scrutiny to apply.  State statutes refer 
to the category of protected religious activity using one of the following three 
terms: “religious exercise,”222 “exercise of religion,”223 or “free exercise of 
religion.”224  While these terms are generally synonymous, and indeed are 
similarly defined, slight variations among definitions could conceivably impact 
the outcome of litigation.  Some states do not define the relevant term at all.225  
 
 219 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401–404 (2009); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1–99 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.3 (West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-22 (West 2009); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–
2407 (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (2005); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (Vernon 2005). 
 220 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 41-1493.01(C) (2004). 
 221 For an example of the application of strict scrutiny to free exercise claims, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963).  Some statutes clarify that the strict scrutiny test applies even to rules of general applicability, 
thus distinguishing the statutory test from the Smith test.  See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302(1) (West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 253(A) (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 1-32-40 (2005). 
 222 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01. 
 223 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005). 
 224 E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §1.302(1) (West Supp. 2009); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West Supp. 
2009). 
 225 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1 
(2006). 
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Others define the term in accordance with the U.S. or state constitution.226  
Florida defines “exercise of religion” as “an act or refusal to act that is 
substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the religious 
exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.”227  
Similar definitions are found in other states.228  New Mexico employs similar 
language but without the statement regarding centrality to a larger system of 
religious belief.229 
Similar variations exist with respect to the burden requirement.  Some 
states require a “substantial burden” on free exercise,230 while others require 
merely a “burden.”231  Further, among the states that require a “substantial 
burden,” the precise definition varies.  Some states choose not to define the 
term at all,232 and a few explicitly define “burden” or “substantial burden” as to 
“inhibit” or “curtail” religious activity.233  Pennsylvania lists four acts that may 
constitute a substantial burden.234  A few states note that the adjective 
“substantial” is included merely to prevent trivial claims, thereby setting the 
bar for demonstrating the required level of burden relatively low.235 
The compelling interest test under RFRA is designed to apply to all claims, 
but some states have more specific provisions for certain categories, such as 
claims by prisoners,236 or provide that certain claims are not covered by the 
 
 226 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(2) (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West Supp. 2009); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(2) (2005). 
 227 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.02(3) (West 2005). 
 228 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(2) (2009); 775 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/5 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. 1.302(2) (West Supp. 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 110.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2005). 
 229 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-2(A) (West 2009). 
 230 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(C) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03(1) (West 2005); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(5) (2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
32-40 (2005). 
 231 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005); see also N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-80.1-3 (2006) (using the term “restrict” instead of 
“burden”). 
 232 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 761.03(1) (West 2005); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2005). 
 233 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(5) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(7) (West 2008). 
 234 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West Supp. 2009). 
 235 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(E) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402(5) (2009). 
 236 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 254 (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2405(g) (West Supp. 
2009). 
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statute at all.237  For example, under Texas law the statute cannot serve as a 
defense to violations of a federal or state civil rights law.238 
Because state RFRAs were enacted relatively recently, their future 
effectiveness is uncertain.  However, in at least some cases where courts have 
reached the merits, it appears that the same methods of interpretation that 
thwarted the intent of the federal RFRA have also surfaced.  For the same 
reasons that higher levels of protection under state constitutions do not always 
lead to greater protection for religious objectors,239 state RFRA statutes may 
not provide any more protection for religious objectors than federal or state 
constitutional claims.  As with the federal RFRA, courts have used the 
“substantial burden” requirement to narrow the scope of state statutes.240  
Further, even where a court finds a substantial burden on religious exercise, the 
court may also find that the state action at issue survives strict scrutiny because 
the state has a compelling interest related to its action, and that action is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.241  These results may be 
explained by the fact that courts have looked to prior interpretations of the 
federal RFRA as a guide for interpreting state versions of the law.  Even where 
state and federal law differ in important ways—such as the inclusion of a 
definition for “religious exercise” or “substantial burden”—these state statutes 
may not yield a result different from the federal RFRA.242 
 
 237 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.307(3) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that the statute cannot be used as a 
defense in personal injury cases, cases where a defendant is charged with possession of a weapon, or cases 
where a defendant is charged with the failure to provide child support or health care for a child’s life-
threatening condition); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2406(b) (West Supp. 2009) (listing exceptions not covered 
by the statute, including criminal defense, health and safety, and reporting of abuse). 
 238 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011(a) (Vernon 2005). 
 239 See supra Part III.C. 
 240 See, e.g., Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 420 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005); Seidman v. Paradise Valley 
Unified Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1118 (D. Ariz. 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ free exercise claims under the U.S. Constitution and state law, after 
finding that the plaintiffs “failed to show a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion” where they 
were required to remove a reference to “God” from an inscription in honor of their daughter that was to appear 
on wall tiles in a public school). 
 241 See State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1010 (Ariz. 2009) (rejecting a defendant’s free exercise claim 
under Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act and holding that “there is no less restrictive alternative that 
would serve the State’s compelling public safety interests and still excuse the conduct [possession of 
marijuana] for which Hardesty was tried and convicted.”). 
 242 See Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 101–02 (Ok. Civ. App. 2003) (finding that a plaintiff failed to 
show that the state substantially burdened his religion even where the state statute at issue provided a relatively 
narrow definition of substantial burden).  The statute at issue in Steele defined “substantially burden” as “to 
inhibit or curtail religiously motivated practice.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 252(7) (West 2008). 
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C. The RLUIPA and the Prospect of Issue-Specific Federal Statutes 
Though the Court struck down the federal RFRA as applied to the states, 
the current success of RLUIPA demonstrates that Congress may still have the 
power to pass a statute that would raise the level of scrutiny applied to claims 
by religious objectors.  Following the demise of RFRA as applied to the states, 
Congress began to develop a narrower federal statute that could withstand a 
constitutional challenge.  Instead of relying solely on Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as Congress had done with respect to RFRA, 
Congress harnessed powers from the Spending and Commerce Clauses to 
enact RLUIPA.243  Because a sweeping statute applying to all free exercise 
claims would be too reminiscent of RFRA, Congress chose to focus on two 
specific areas where the rights of individuals and religious organizations have 
traditionally been curtailed by the states—the free exercise rights of prisoners 
and the land use rights of churches and religious organizations.244 
Although both statutes require the application of strict scrutiny, RFRA 
applies only to certain categories of claims.  In addition, RLUIPA defines 
certain terms that were initially undefined under RFRA.  The first section of 
RLUIPA applies to land use regulations,245 and the second section applies to 
institutionalized persons.246  Both sections prohibit governments from 
“impos[ing] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,” unless 
the government can show that imposition of the burden is “in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”247  For both land use 
regulations and institutionalized persons, the statute applies where the burden 
is in relation to programs or activities that receive federal funding and where it 
affects—or would affect if removed—interstate or foreign commerce.248 
Unlike some state RFRAs, the statute does not define “substantial burden.”  
Instead, Congress relied on the courts to employ pre-Smith free exercise 
 
 243 See generally 42 USC §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. 
 244 Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s 
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2005). 
 245 42 USC § 2000cc. 
 246 42 USC §§ 2000cc-1. 
 247 42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(3)(a).  In the case of land use regulations “person” includes a 
religious assembly or institution.  42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(1). 
 248 42 USC §§ 2000cc(a)(2), 2000cc-1(3)(b).  These jurisdictional elements relate to Congress’s authority 
to enact legislation under the Spending and Commerce Clauses. 
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jurisprudence to determine whether a substantial burden truly exists.249  
Though it does not define substantial burden, RLUIPA defines “religious 
exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief,”250 and further clarifies that “the use, building, 
or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise” is 
considered religious exercise of the person or entity that seeks to use the 
property for that purpose.251  The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the 
government action has substantially burdened free exercise, but once this is 
achieved, the burden shifts to the government to prove that it has used the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.252  The Act 
further requires that courts construe the language of the statute “in favor of a 
broad protection of religious exercise.”253 
Although the language of RLUIPA is similar to state and federal RFRA 
statutes, during RLUIPA’s first few years of operation, claimants seem to have 
enjoyed greater success under it than under the federal or state RFRA statutes, 
particularly with respect to prisoner claims.254  Part of this success has been 
attributed to Congress’s definition of “religious exercise” in RLUIPA, which 
was initially absent from the federal RFRA.255  Under the federal RFRA, many 
state and lower federal courts construed religious exercise narrowly, requiring 
either that conduct be mandated or compelled by the claimant’s religion,256 or 
be “central to” the religion to find in the claimant’s favor.257  The definitions of 
exercise of religion and substantial burden were thus intertwined under RFRA.  
A review of prisoner claims under the federal RFRA prior to Boerne shows 
that courts commonly concluded that there was no substantial burden because 
the conduct at issue was not central to, or mandated by, the prisoner’s 
 
 249 Gaubatz, supra note 244, at 517. 
 250 42 USC § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  Under this definition, conduct need not be mandated by the religion, and 
discretionary conduct also can receive protection if it is grounded in religious belief. Gaubatz, supra note 244, 
at 522. 
 251 42 USC § 2000cc-5(7)(B). 
 252 42 USC § 2000cc-2(b). 
 253 42 USC § 2000cc-3(g). 
 254 See Gaubatz, supra note 244 (comparing the success of prisoner claims under RFRA with the success 
of claims under RLUIPA from 2001 to 2005). 
 255 Id. at 505.  Congress has since incorporated RLUIPA’s definition of religious exercise into RFRA.  42 
USC § 2000bb-2(4). 
 256 See Gaubatz, supra note 244 at 510 (noting that the Eleventh, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, in 
addition to state and district courts, took this approach). 
 257 See id. at 532 (noting the findings of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as 
state and district courts). 
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beliefs.258  This has led some scholars to conclude that the inclusion of a 
broader definition of “religious exercise” under RLUIPA prevents courts from 
limiting the effect of RLUIPA because it discourages construing “religious 
exercise” narrowly.259 
At least one study indicates that the distinctions between RFRA and 
RLUIPA, including the definition of the term “religious exercise” and the 
naming of specific categories of claims, have made an appreciable difference 
in the outcome of litigation.  As of 2005, forty-six cases had addressed the 
merits in RLUIPA cases involving prisoners.260  Of these cases, only seven 
were dismissed for failure to demonstrate a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.261  This stands in contrast with prisoner claims brought under RFRA, 
of which seventy-five percent were dismissed.  At least some claims regarding 
land use regulations have enjoyed similar success.262 
V. A PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME FOR PROTECTING RELIGIOUS 
OBJECTORS 
Because not all states provide statute-specific religious exemptions from 
laws that protect same-sex couples,263 and because free exercise jurisprudence, 
as well as federal and state RFRA laws and RLUIPA, all fail to offer such 
exemptions, a new solution is needed to protect the religious liberty of those 
objecting to the establishment of same-sex relationships.  Though at least one 
scholar has suggested that issues of conscience should be resolved through 
 
 258 Id. at 528. 
 259 Id. at 505. 
 260 Id. at 557. 
 261 Id. at 569.  Success under RLUIPA is not unlimited, however.  See, e.g., Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 
897, 906–08 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that prison policies prohibiting male inmates from wearing beards and 
hair below the collar did not violate RLUIPA because the state has a compelling interest in prisoner safety and 
security, and the policy was narrowly tailored to serve that interest). 
 262 See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding 
that a zoning board’s denial of a permit application for a religious school violated RLUIPA); Guru Nanak Sikh 
Soc’y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a county’s denial of a 
conditional use permit to build a Sikh temple on land zoned for agricultural use violated RLUIPA).  But see 
Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a zoning 
ordinance that prohibited churches from operating in an industrial zone did not substantially burden religious 
exercise and therefore did not violate RLUIPA). 
 263 See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of states that provide members of the clergy 
with religious exemptions from same-sex marriage laws. 
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social and economic, rather than legal or political, means,264 the following 
sections explain that a statute protecting the right of conscience need not be as 
one-sided as legislation in this area has typically been.  Section A compares the 
benefits of state and federal statutes and concludes that, although state statutes 
are preferable to federal ones because of limitations on congressional power, a 
federal statute is still needed.  Thus section B proposes a federal law modeled 
after RLUIPA. 
A. State vs. Federal Approaches 
Unlike the conflict between the federal Constitutional right to abortion or 
contraception and the conscience rights of health care workers, the conflict 
discussed here pits the state rights of same-sex couples against the conscience 
rights of religious objectors.265  Although in some respects this distinction 
indicates that the state would be the most appropriate forum for resolving the 
dispute, the need for uniformity and the unlikelihood that states will address 
the growing conflict suggest the need for a federal statute. 
1. Benefits of State Solutions 
State statutory solutions would be beneficial, and arguably better than 
federal ones, for two reasons.  First, states possess broader authority to 
legislate than Congress.  Congress’s power to legislate is limited by the powers 
enumerated in the Constitution, but state legislatures are not similarly 
bound.266  Additionally, Congress must ensure that statutes do not raise 
concerns of federalism or sovereign immunity under the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments,267 but states may legislate freely without regard to these 
concerns as long as the legislation has not been preempted by federal law.268  
For these reasons, states may enact more comprehensive legislation in many 
areas, offering that offers greater protection to a broader class of potential 
claimants, than can Congress. 
Second, most of the current rights of same-sex partners are rights conferred 
by state law.  With the exception of a few internal government policies and two 
Supreme Court cases expanding rights for homosexuals (though not 
 
 264 See Vischer, supra note 22, at 95–98 (arguing for a marketplace approach to protect pharmacists’ right 
of conscience). 
 265 See supra Part I.A. 
 266 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the powers of Congress). 
 267 U.S. CONST. amends. X, XI. 
 268 See infra note 274 (discussing preemption). 
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recognizing a right to same-sex marriage or the treatment of homosexuals as a 
suspect class), same-sex partners do not enjoy special protection as a class 
under federal law.269  The fact that the state is the source of the rights of same-
sex couples could mean that the state is the most natural and appropriate forum 
for balancing these two sets of rights.  However, as noted below, this fact also 
supports the use of a federal statute. 
2. Benefits of Federal Solutions 
Given the success of state conscience clauses in protecting the rights of 
doctors who refuse to perform abortions, one might wonder whether state 
statutes alone could provide sufficient protection for religious objectors to 
same-sex unions.270  While state statutory exemptions like those in New 
Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont should be encouraged, there is reason to think 
that state statutes will not emerge in this area either as quickly or as uniformly 
as they did in the abortion context.  By passing conscience clauses related to 
abortion, states were reacting to a newly recognized federal constitutional right 
that conflicted with the religious views of some doctors.271  Here, the conflict 
arises from newly recognized state rights, which could make state solutions to 
the conflict less likely.  If one views the conflict between same-sex rights and 
religious conscience rights as a showdown with just one winner and one 
loser,272 states providing rights to same-sex couples may have already chosen a 
side. 
Even if some states weigh in with statutory protections, it is unlikely that 
all states will create similar protections.  This could lead to a patchwork of 
different levels of protection in different states similar to the existing variation 
in state health care conscience clauses.273  In contrast, a federal statute would 
provide a uniform approach, or at least a minimum standard, for protecting 
religious objectors.  Further, a federal statute would have the added benefit of 
preempting any conflicting state law that might impose an affirmative 
obligation on religious objectors.274 
 
 269 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the current rights of same-sex couples under federal law). 
 270 See supra Part IV.A (discussing state conscience clauses for pharmacists). 
 271 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 81–86 (describing legislative responses to protect doctors who refused to 
perform abortions in the wake of Roe v. Wade). 
 272 See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 22 at 88 (criticizing scholars on both sides of the debate over the 
conscience rights of pharmacists for viewing the conflict as a “zero-sum game”). 
 273 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 90 (describing variation in conscience clause protections). 
 274 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.7 (2000) (“The State concedes, as it 
must, that in addressing the subject of the federal Act, Congress has the power to preempt the state statute.” 
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B. The RLUIPA as a Model for a Federal Conscience Statute 
A comparison of the success of RLUIPA with the shortcomings of RFRA 
demonstrates that RLUIPA contains several improvements that could be 
incorporated into a religious conscience statute.  First, RLUIPA provides 
guidance for how to create a statute that is better able to withstand 
constitutional challenges.  Second, it shows that by narrowing the scope of the 
statute to specific types of claims and defining key terms in the statute, 
Congress can better achieve its goal of protecting the intended class of 
claimants.  This second lesson of RLUIPA is particularly relevant as it applies 
to both state and federal statutes. 
1. A Broader Scope: Beyond Funding Legislation 
Under the RLUIPA model, Congress maximizes its authority to enact 
legislation by utilizing the full extent of its powers under both the Spending 
Clause and the Commerce Clause.275  As with RLUIPA, the Spending Clause 
could cover a broad range of activities related to the rights of same-sex 
couples.  Federal funding of healthcare facilities could be used to bring 
healthcare workers within the statute, and Congress could potentially regulate 
areas like adoption through ties to funding of state child welfare systems.  It 
would likely be more difficult to tie federal funding to marriage. 
For areas that fall outside the scope of the Spending Clause,276 Congress 
should include a commerce-based jurisdictional clause similar to the one in 
RLUIPA, providing that the statute covers any burdens that substantially affect 
foreign or interstate commerce, or activities that would substantially affect 
such commerce if the burden were removed.277  Such a clause might bring 
within the scope of the statute any situations where a couple crosses state lines 
to obtain services.278  The scope of the statute could also be broadened to cover 
 
(emphasis added)).  Because the issue of preemption is largely a matter of congressional intent, the statute 
should clearly state that it preempts state law.  See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) 
(analyzing whether the Federal Boat Safety Act preempted state common law tort claims); see also Karen A. 
Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 
(1998) (reviewing the history of preemption and discussing the complexities of the Court’s preemption 
analysis). 
 275 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the powers that Congress used to enact RLUIPA). 
 276 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 277 See supra Part IV.C (describing the jurisdictional clauses of RLUIPA). 
 278 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (“Congress is empowered to regulate and protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities.” (emphasis added)). 
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a wide range of activities related to same-sex marriage ceremonies if Congress 
could demonstrate that in the aggregate, same-sex marriage ceremonies or civil 
union ceremonies have a substantial affect on interstate commerce.279 
This argument might not be successful in light of United States. v. 
Morrison, where the Court held that, because gender-motivated violence is not 
an economic activity and because Congress failed to show that this activity 
“substantially affected interstate commerce,” Congress lacked sufficient power 
under the Commerce Clause to pass the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA). 280  This is particularly true since the areas of marriage and family 
are traditionally regulated by the state.281  However, the Court might view the 
provision of services in connection with marriage ceremonies as constituting 
economic activity in a way that violence against women does not.282  Even if 
the courts were to ultimately take a narrow approach to the scope of the statute 
under the Commerce Clause, by utilizing a jurisdictional provision and 
combining congressional power under the Spending Clause and the Commerce 
Clause, Congress can provide protection to the fullest extent of its powers 
under the Constitution.283 
2. A Method for Limiting the Scope of Exemptions 
Some limits must be placed on the types of exemptions or accommodations 
allowed for religious objectors.284  Otherwise, instead of balancing the rights at 
stake, exemptions will always privilege the rights of religious objectors over 
the rights of same-sex couples, regardless of the circumstances or nature of the 
religious objection.  Therefore, both the nature of the exemption and the 
availability of alternative service providers should be considered in 
determining whether an exemption should be granted.  These considerations 
can be incorporated into a strict scrutiny analysis.285  The nature of the 
 
 279 See Gaubatz, supra note 244, at 538 (arguing that administration of prisoners might fall within the 
scope of RLUIPA because states frequently send prisoners to facilities in other states). 
 280 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–19 (2000). 
 281 See id. at 615–16 (raising the concern that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely 
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority,” noting that “the suppression of 
[violent crime] has always been the prime object of the States’ police power,” and describing “family law” as 
an area “of traditional state regulation”). 
 282 The economic activity would be the provision of services in connection with marriage and family 
rather than the marriage itself. 
 283 See Morrison, 529 at 613 (noting the absence of a jurisdictional clause in VAWA). 
 284 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 285 The analysis would mirror the analysis used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963), and 
in some post-Smith state constitutional decisions, discussed supra Part III.C.  However, given the limits of 
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exemption goes to the weight of the burden on the claimant and the strength of 
the state’s compelling interest.  The availability of alternative service providers 
indicates whether the state has used the least restrictive means for achieving its 
interest. 
By employing a strict scrutiny analysis for claims brought under the 
proposed statute instead of creating an absolute exemption, Congress could 
create a flexible scheme that would allow courts to balance the rights of same-
sex couples with the rights of religious objectors.286  This would weaken 
criticism that by passing the statute, Congress is attempting to completely 
undermine states’ rights or permit religious objectors to mechanically trump 
the rights of same-sex couples.  The requirement that states employ the least 
restrictive means for achieving a compelling interest would protect most 
religious objectors because there will generally be other providers who can 
perform the same services.287  If, however, Congress chose to pass a 
comprehensive act, covering many different, for example, where conscience 
conflicts with the right to same-sex marriage, the delivery of healthcare 
services or pharmaceuticals, or the right to make personal decisions about 
healthcare treatment, a narrow tailoring requirement would become especially 
important and could yield different outcomes depending on the interests at 
stake. 
In light of the problems with RFRA, any religious conscience statute, state 
or federal, that requires a strict scrutiny analysis should include explicit 
definitions of key terms.288  This will ensure that the flexibility mentioned 
above does not come at the expense of claimants who Congress intended to 
cover under the statute.  For instance, Congress could refer to burdens on 
“conscience” rather than burdens on “religious exercise” and could define 
burdens on conscience to include any requirement that an individual directly 
contribute to or participate in acts against their religious beliefs.  This 
definition would exclude most potential claims by places of public 
accommodation because the act of providing services to homosexuals would 
not involve directly participating in the formation of a union or the 
 
these state constitutional decisions, the statute should make it clear that the goal of prohibiting discrimination 
is not sufficient to overcome a strict scrutiny analysis.  Instead, the narrow tailoring requirement must be 
examined separately in the context of each case. 
 286 See Vischer, supra note 22 (arguing for a more balanced approach to the conflict between pharmacist 
rights and healthcare rights). 
 287 See, for example, N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 
959, 963 (Cal. 2008), where the plaintiff was able to receive IUI from another service provider. 
 288 See supra Part IV.C (comparing RLUIPA to RFRA). 
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establishment of a family.289  For instance, it would not cover a restaurant 
owner who refused to allow a same-sex couple to dine in his or her restaurant, 
but it would cover professionals like the doctors in North Coast. 
The scope of the religious conscience statute should clarified by including a 
list of specific claimants or specific spheres of conflict.290  The statute could 
either track RLUIPA by providing separate sections for each sphere of conflict 
or class of claimants,291 or it could simply provide a list of examples.  The 
benefit of including separate sections, similar to RLUIPA, is that the statute 
would be easier to interpret.  The downside, however, is that this could 
foreclose relief in areas not included in the statutory list of examples. 
3. An Ability to Withstand Potential Constitutional Challenges 
If a federal statute is indeed the best way to protect religious conscience, in 
addition to ensuring that the statute is grounded in the necessary Article I 
powers, Congress must ensure that the measure can withstand other 
constitutional challenges.  The most likely challenges would be raised under 
the Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  RLUIPA has been 
challenged on both grounds, and the statute has survived so far.  Similarly, the 
statute proposed here should survive any constitutional challenges on these 
grounds. 
a. Establishment Clause Challenges 
In addition to protecting free exercise of religion, the First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law affecting the establishment of any 
religion.”292  In challenging RLUIPA, opponents argued that the law was 
impermissible under the Establishment Clause, in part because it gave greater 
protection to religious rights than to other constitutional rights.293  In Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, the Court upheld RLUIPA against exactly this claim because the 
law did not single out any particular religion for either special or 
 
 289 There are exceptions to this general statement.  For example, the owner of a place of public 
accommodation, such as a restaurant or hotel, who is asked to host a wedding ceremony might face a “burden” 
under the statute, although the level of burden imposed on such an owner may not rise to the same level as the 
burden imposed on a minister who is asked to perform the ceremony. 
 290 The claimants should include religious organizations as well as individuals, as under RLUIPA. 
 291 See supra Part IV.C. 
 292 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 293 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005). 
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disadvantaged treatment.294  Although the Court noted that its ruling did not 
foreclose the possibility of future as-applied challenges, or challenges brought 
under other constitutional provisions,295 the decision in Cutter makes it likely 
that a federal statute modeled after RLUIPA will survive any facial challenges 
under the Establishment Clause. 
b. Tenth Amendment Challenges 
The Tenth Amendment limits the power of Congress to regulate state 
activities.296  For example, the Supreme Court has said that the Tenth 
Amendment prohibits Congress from using its power to “directly compel the 
States to require or prohibit” certain acts.297  Several defendants have 
challenged RLUIPA under the Tenth Amendment.  Although this issue has not 
yet reached the Supreme Court, the few circuit courts that have addressed the 
question are in agreement that RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment.298  As the Second Circuit has found, RLUIPA does not compel 
states to “require or prohibit” any specific act; instead, it allows states the 
discretion to regulate the activity covered by the Act as long as the state’s 
regulation does not substantially burden religious exercise in violation of the 
statute.299  By requiring a strict scrutiny analysis instead of providing a total 
exemption, the federal religious conscience statute proposed here would 
similarly give states discretion to regulate the activities at issue as long as the 
states do not violate the rights of objectors under the statute. 
4. Effects of the Statute Outside of Litigation 
Some critics might assert that this legislation would produce a flood of 
litigation, but the statute would most likely be used as a defense by individuals, 
who are accused of violating the rights of same-sex couples.300  In this sense, 
the religious conscience statute would not create litigation because those 
 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 297 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 298 E.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355 (2d Cir. 2007); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2004); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 
F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 299 Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 355. 
 300 See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 967 
(Cal. 2008) (where the defendants invoked state and federal free exercise claims as a defense to the plaintiff’s 
allegations that the defendants violated the state civil rights statute). 
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protected by the statute would use it as a defensive shield rather than a sword 
with which they would sue.  In fact, the statute might even deter litigation by 
encouraging individuals and states to develop their own systems for protecting 
both the right of conscience and any conflicting rights so that all parties can 
enjoy their rights without resorting to a lengthy court proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict between the rights of same-sex couples and the rights of 
religious objectors highlights the deficiencies in the Court’s current free 
exercise jurisprudence, which relies heavily on states and legislatures to protect 
religious objectors.  The rights of same-sex couples are nearly all derived from 
state law; thus, it makes sense to balance the rights of these two groups at the 
state level, through state level statutes or religious exemptions.  However, 
North Coast illustrates a failure of heightened standards of scrutiny at the state 
level to protect the rights of religious objectors.  In the wake of North Coast, 
and the overall failure of state RFRAs and stricter state interpretations of free 
exercise to provide greater protections for religious objectors, the need for 
federal protection of religious objectors is more pronounced.  RLUIPA 
provides an effective model for creating a more effective, yet flexible, statute.  
By combining its power under the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause, 
Congress can cover the broadest field of potential claims allowed under the 
Constitution.  By defining terms and requiring a strict scrutiny analysis under 
the statute, Congress can give courts the direction needed to ensure a proper 
reading of the statute while still allowing courts the flexibility to consider the 
rights of same-sex couples who might be adversely affected by religious 
exemptions. 
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